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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SUBDIVISION CONTROL
EXACTIONS: THE QUEST FOR A RATIONALE
John D. Johnston, Jr.t
The author analyzes the "voluntariness," "privilege" and "police power"
rationales commonly used to justify subdivision control exactions and con-
cludes that the "police power" rationale is the most appropriate. He then
examines three general categories of exactions-for streets, paving and
utilities, and educational and recreational uses-in order to delimit the
proper exercise of the police power. He concludes that municipalities
should have the burden of establishing a rational nexus between their
exactions and the public needs created by a subdivision development.
The task of translating scientific and technological advancement into
societal improvement provides one of mankind's most profound chal-
lenges. Indeed, a scientific or technical innovation can be evaluated only
in the light of its actual use in improving the quality of human life. In
this context, man's greatest achievements sometimes illuminate his most
abject failures. Advancements in industrial productivity and medical sci-
ence, for instance, have confronted our society with enormous challenges
in the use of expanding leisure time and the resolution of complex social
problems attributable to enhanced longevity,
A similar challenge is presented by man's increasing ability to control
and shape his physical environment. The post-war years, in particular,
have marked a growing recognition of societal responsibility for the
quality of our environment, especially in the urban sector. Today effective
action to improve the beneficial aspects of urban life and to diminish or
eliminate the others is widely perceived as a social imperative.1 Unfor-
tunately, recognition of society's accountability for the urban environment
constitutes no guarantee of effective action to improve it. To date there
has been very little argreement on objectives, priorities, or means of
implementationY
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I See, e.g., the congressional declaration that "improving the quality of urban life is the
most critical domestic problem facing the United States," in the initial sentence of the
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, Pub. L. 89-754, 80 Stat. 1255
(1966).
[I~t has taken many hundreds of years for man to realize that if he has the power to
alter the course of natural events, then he also has the obligation to initiate his own
methods of reparation. This is required morally of man as a responsible being; it is
required physically of man as an inhabitant of the earth, if he is to live in a state of
well-being in harmony with his environment.
Freund, "What Is This Thing Called Beautification?", 18 Zoning Digest 373, 378 (1966).
2 "City planning is a most peculiar activity and a most peculiar profession. Indeed, there is
probably no other single field of endeavor where so much controversy and confusion exist
about what exactly the activity is and should be . . . "' Hartman, Book Review, 76 Yale
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Meanwhile, existing problems grow more acute. For instance, the con-
tinuing migration of rural residents to urban areas' and the population
decline among major cities4 create an enormous demand for suburban resi-
dences' and ancillary municipal services. Rapid suburban development
LJ. 243 (1967). A recent case-study in urban planning, exposing its philosophical, social, and
political complexities, is Altshuler, The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis (1965).
3 Urban population of the United States, as measured by decennial census, did not surpass
total rural population until 1920. By 1960, urban residents comprised almost 707 of total
population. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 15, 22 (1966).
For definition of urban and rural areas, see id. at 2. It has been estimated that, by the year
2000, 80% of America's population will be concentrated in metropolitan areas. Message from
the President, Demonstration Cities Act, 112 Cong. Rec. 1101 (1966). This projection is
consistent with recent studies by the Urban Land Institute, which "reveal that by 2,000, 239
million Americans-77 percent of the nation's population, will live in three gigantic urban
regions, 19 smaller regions, and great metropolises which will extend over 11 percent of [the
coterminous United States) .... " Pickard, The Continuing Challenge, 26 Urban Land, No. 2,
at 2 (Feb. 1967).
4 Comparison of the 1960 decennial census with the 1950 report showed slight population
declines in New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Baltimore, San Francisco, and
Washington, D.C.; more severe losses were revealed in Detroit, Boston, and St. Louis. U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 20-21 (1966).
6 The post-war "flight to the suburbs" has frequently been accomplished through a pattern
of residential development characterized as "sprawl." The process was succinctly described as
follows:
As the flight to the suburbs and to outlying areas gathered speed, much of the develop-
ment took place in long vertical strips along highways. Often, desirable nearby land was
skipped over in a leapfrogging operation and homes were built on cheaper outlying land,
complete with septic tanks and wells which functioned satisfactorily only until densities
grew too great. Before long, tanks and wells needed to be replaced at considerable expense
by sewer and water lines, which would themselves have been cheaper if installed in the
first place.
The prevailing pattern in many localities of providing only single-family houses on -
relatively large lots contributed to the rapid consumption of land. This added both to
the cost of the land and also to the cost of installing streets, sidewalks, and water and
sewer lines. To the extent that this pattern truly reflected consumer preferences, the
added costs were voluntarily assumed by home buyers. But to the extent that it was a
result of blind or ill-considered restrictions in local zoning or subdivision ordinances,
the resulting sprawl represented a waste of land and of site improvement expenditures.
The pattern also resulted in narrowing the choices open to consumers. Among those
excluded from vast suburban areas were those who preferred to rent or who could not
assume the burden of caring for a house and lawn. It became increasingly difficult for aged
persons to find suitable accommodations in suburbs so that they could live near their
children and grandchildren.
It excluded those who preferred to live in a well-planned and well-balanced new com-
munity with a large variety of housing within walking distance of employment, shopping,
and recreation. Also excluded were those who preferred to live in a subdivision where
individual homes, garden apartments, and high-rise apartments were clustered together,
with large areas of surrounding vacant land left in its natural state or improved for purposes
of outdoor recreation . . . . Much construction takes place in areas which were until
recently rural, where building codes are obsolete or lacking and where zoning and sub-
division ordinances are defective or lacking. Economic and esthetic values and civic ameni-
ties are too often destroyed by the juxtaposition of inconsistent residential, commercial,
and industrial uses. They may also be destroyed by the uneconomic and needless separa-
tion of such uses-giving rise to monotony; the absence of community facilities; and
excessive travel to work, to shopping, and to places of recreation.
Report of the U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Development, Hearings Before the Subcommit-
tee on Executive Reorganization of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., Appendix to pt. 1, at 22-23 (1966).
6 Between 1957 and ,1962, local governmental units outside standard metropolitan statistical
areas reported much more dramatic increases in expenditures for water, sewers, fire and police
protection, health, and education than units within such areas. Not surprisingly, these outlying
units also reported a far greater increase in outstanding debt over this period. International
City Managers' Ass'n, The Municipal Year Book 38 (1965).
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raises two pervasive issues of critical importance for city and county offi-
cials: (1) What controls can be effectively employed to assure optimum
land utilization in view of projected population increases? (2) How
can the municipality's ability to assume necessary capital costs and supply
expanded services be more closely related to the pace of urbanization?
The past half-century has seen the introduction and evolution of several
devices designed to meet these problems, the most widely employed being
zoning, special assessments, and subdivision control regulations. From a
private developer's standpoint, imposition of any of these devices by a
municipality can adversely affect the profitability of his enterprise. This
may occur directly, as, for example, when a municipality forces him to
contribute land or cash for public improvements; or indirectly, as when
the most profitable use of his land is prohibited. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that developers have sometimes vigorously contested the legality of
each of these devices, usually claiming that they are ultra vires, deprive
the developer of his property without due process of law, or constitute a
taking of private property for public use without compensation. Counsel
for municipalities, on the other hand, have generally defended these de-
vices as a proper exercise of police and taxing powers.
When developers have challenged the validity of these devices, the
sharp conflict presented between public needs and private interests has
caused the American judiciary to respond in discordant tones. Perhaps
more disappointing, however, is the tendency of courts to elaborate upon
the conclusions reached rather than to discuss the factors which actually
influenced each decision. Hence, not only have different theories been used
to justify and limit the use of these devices, but effective analysis has
been made even more difficult by the judiciary's unwillingness to focus
upon the interests which these various theories are designed to protect.
The tendency to avoid discussion of the difficult but crucial issues is
nowhere more perplexing than in subdivision control cases. Declarations
of judicial deference to legislative determinations bearing on the public
welfare characterize those opinions which uphold disputed subdivision
exactions.7 On the other hand, opinions favorable to developers often con-
[T]he tidal wave of metropolitan growth is engulfing the suburbs and bringing them
face to face with the realities of urban expansion. Visions of semi-rustic life have van-
ished in the ring communities as the urbanized sectors have pushed outward, bringing in
their wake new roads and expressways, huge shopping centers and industrial plants, and
blight and congestion .... Increasing service demands, mounting governmental costs,
rising tax rates, and land use sprawl have become the common lot of outlying local units
situated in the path of this growth.
Schmandt, "Municipal Control of Urban Expansion," 29 Fordham L. Rev. 637 (1961).
7 A classic example is Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956),
discussed at text accompanying notes 121-36 infra. See also the discussion of Ayres v. City
Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949), at text accompanying notes 81-98 infra; Billings
Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.Zd '182 (1964), at text a ¢om-
panying notes 192-201 infra.
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tain little more than emphatic assertions that property may not be taken
without compensation, and that a taking may result from unreasonable
restrictions on the use of land even though unaccompanied by physical
appropriation.8 Of course, neither interest should be allowed to nullify the
other. In the usual case, however, the balance struck between them is
obscured by a pronouncement that the decision was reached by use of
some unexplained "reasonableness" test.9
This article will review some of the more significant cases concerning
subdivision control regulations in an attempt to formulate a sound and
consistent approach to their validity in urban planning.
I
SUBDIVISION CONTROL IN HISTOUCAL CONTEXT
The earliest subdivision control enabling acts preceded zoning legisla-
tion in many states." Since their purpose was to promote ease of convey-
ancing and stability of land titles, they dealt primarily with disclosure
of engineering and surveying data.11 Only within the past fifty years has
subdivision plat approval been integrated with community planning. Al-
though the first Model City Planning Enabling Act did not appear until
1928,1 by 1934 some 269 local planning boards were exercising powers
of subdivision control in twenty-nine states?3 A survey in early 1965
8 See discussions of Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 I1. 2d 375,
176 N.E.2d 799 (1961), at text accompanying notes 169-77 infra; Amller v. Beaver Falls, 368
Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951), at text accompanying notes 154-58 infra.
9 The authors of an excellent recent analysis have concluded that judicial aproaches to
"reasonableness" of land use regulations may be classified under four general headings, two of
which may be further subdivided. Heyman & Gilhool, "The Constitutionality of Imposing
Increased Community Costs On New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions,"
73 Yale L.J. 11.19, 1124-30 (1964). These formulations encompass a spectrum ranging from
a deferential "confiscation" test to the correlative-benefits test initiated by Plymouth Coal
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914) and utilized by Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Although the latter aproach has been abandoned
by the United States Supreme Court, it retains formidable vitality in some state courts. See
Paulsen, "The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States," 34 Minn. L. Rev. 91
(1950); Hetherington, "State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law,"
53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 13 (1958). One article concludes that the confiscation test "avoids the
more subtle questions," while the correlative benefit test "does not focus attention on all the
meaningful considerations." Heyman & Gilhool, supra at 1127-28.
10 "Municipal control of land subdivision is not new. A number of enabling statutes or
charter provisions authorized some form of regulation in the last century. Real estate sub-
dividers were required to obtain approval from some local official or commission before the
subdivision plat could be recorded." Reps, "Control of Land Subdivision By Municipal Plan-
ning Boards," 40 Cornell L.Q. 258 (.1955).
11 According to a survey published in 1941, the requirements most frequently imposed
were drawings to scale, on cloth, with indication of the north point. A surveyor's certificate
was more frequently required than an indication of the name of the subdivision. Lautner,
Subdivision Regulations 219 (1941). Engineering data most frequently required included
location of monuments, lot lines, dimensions, and streets. Id. at 225.
12 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, A Standard City Planning Enabling Act (1928) [hereinafter
cited as Standard Planning Act].
13 Reps, supra note 10, at 259.
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showed that, of 1,377 American cities with more than 10,000 population,
1,261 had an official planning agency.14
Today subdivision control is inseparable from the planning process.
Generally, state enabling legislation encourages municipalities to develop
a master plan of future growth. 5 Planning boards are empowered to pro-
hibit recordation of subdivision plats which do not meet the requirements
of the master plan.16 The most common conditions imposed are (1) that
certain of the subdivided lands be dedicated for streets, parks or schools,
and (2) that certain utilities be installed to serve the subdivision residents.
Sometimes, in lieu of actual dedication or construction, an "equalization
fee" will be exacted to help defray the municipality's expense of installing
or adding to relevant services.' 7 The extent to which these conditions are
actually imposed upon developers is a function of two variables: the
scope of control permitted by the state enabling act, and the degree to
which state courts are willing to supervise official action.
Many early judicial opinions contained assertions that developers have
no duty to take the public interest into account in planning their subdivi-
sions.'8 A correlative proposition was that, in the absence of special en-
abling legislation, municipalities have no inherent power to impose sub-
division control regulations.'9 Although subdivision control enabling acts
are now effective in every jurisdiction,"° their interpretation by the judi-
ciary may well reflect the conviction that they constitute an interference
with the time-honored freedom of developers. As the objective of sub-
division control has shifted from promotion of the stability of land titles
to exaction of costly improvements for the benefit of the subdivision resi-
dents, the probability of adverse judicial reaction has been considerably
heightened; 2' and where the requirements include exactions of land for
14 International City Managers' Ass'n, The Municipal Year Book 315 (1965).
15 See notes 75-80 infra and accompanying text.
10 See notes 50-65 infra and accompanying text.
17 See notes 180-226 infra and accompanying text.
18 "In the absence of any statute on the subject, the owner of land might subdivide it in any
way he saw fit, having regard only to his own wishes and without regard to public convenience."
People ex rel. Tilden v. Massieon, 279 Ill. 312, 315, 116 N.E. 639, 640 (1917). Compare the fol-
lowing statement, made forty-five years later: "Thus, the business of subdividing is one
affected with a public interest, and is subject to reasonable regulation to protect this interest."
Comment, 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 310,321 n. 57 (1961).
19 See, e.g., Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957) ; Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 III. 2d 448, 1167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
20 The most complete analysis of planning and subdivision control statutes appears as an
appendix to Haar, "The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution," 20 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 353, 378-418 (1955). Much of this material is now out of date, however, because of
subsequent statutory changes. A more current legislative digest is contained in Anderson &
Roswig, Planning, Zoning, and Subdivision: A Summary of Statutory Law in the 50 States
(1966).
21 The entire municipality is a healthier, safer environment when subdivisions are provided
with adequate streets, water, sanitation, and open space. It is this benefit to the total com-
munity which sustains the exercise of the police power, rather than a more direct benefit to
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uses which will benefit the general public as well, the probability of in-
validation is maximized.22
The transition in goals of subdivision control has necesitated re-
consideration of its rationale. The observable progression has been
from "voluntariness," to "privilege," to the police power.
A. "Voluntariness"
Since residential sites are unsalable without reasonable access, a de-
veloper usually provides for one or more new streets when he divides
a tract of land into lots.2 Recordation of a plat showing new streets con-
stitutes an offer of dedication for public use.24 Acceptance by the local
governing body is not obligatory or automatic, but may take place in
several established ways.25 In many jurisdictions, statutes prescribe the
method by which streets can be withdrawn from dedication after accept-
ance.26 Even where there has been no acceptance for public use, the sale
of lots by reference to a recorded plat constitutes an estoppel to withdraw
streets from dedication without permission of abutting lot owners 7 Offers
of dedication for park or recreational uses may take place in the same
manner and with similar consequences2 8
the subdivision itself. In addition, streets and recreation areas are available for use by the
general public. It is thus difficult to perceive any basis for distinguishing between compulsory
dedication for streets on the one hand and for recreation or educational uses on the other, on
the ground that the latter constitute a greater benefit to the general public. As we shall see,
however, some decisions have so held.
22 Although Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, supra note 19, held that cash exactions
for educational purposes were not authorized, the opinion includes this revealing statement:
"But because the requirement that a plat of subdivision be approved affords an appropriate
point of control with respect to costs made necessary by the subdivision, it does not follow
that communities may use this point of control to solve all of the problems which they can
foresee." Id. at 453, 167 N.E.2d at 234. This ominous warning presaged the holding, in
Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799
(1961), that a subsequent enabling act authorizing such exactions was unconstitutional.
23 Some subdivision control enabling acts subject developers to planning regulations only
where the proposed subdivision will require the opening of a new street. E.g., Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 41, § 81L (1966). Other enabling acts define "subdivision" so as to include any
division of a lot or tract into a greater number of lots for the purpose of sale or of building
development. E.g., Standard Planning Act § 1. The Washington statute embodies both tests.
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 58.16.010 (1961).
24 Recordation of a plat showing new streets is generally held to constitute sufficient mani-
festation of an intent to dedicate them to public use. 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations
§ 33.30, at 702 (3d ed. rev. 1964).
25 Id. §§ 33.47-33.52; 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law .§ 9.04 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Antieau]. For discussion of the distinctions between "common law" and "statutory"
dedication, see Comment, "Dedication of Land in California," 53 Calif. L. Rev. 559 (1965).
26 At common law, an offer of dedication could be revoked at any time before acceptance
for public use so long as no intervening public or private interests would be impaired. 1,1
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 33.60 (3d ed. rev. 1964). Where plat recordation com-
plies with statutory dedication procedures, it has been held that the dedication is complete
and cannot thereafter be revoked. Ibid.
Failure of the municipality to open or maintain a platted street within a prescribed number
of years can constitute abandonment, whereby title reverts to the dedicator or passes to
abutting lanilowners. Id., §§ 33.79-33.80. The same result generally obtains when a street is
vacated after public use by appropriate municipal authority. 1 Antieau § 9.10.
27 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 33.63 (3d ed. rev. 1964).
28 See, e.g., Point Pleasant Manor Bldg. Co. v. Brown, 42 N.J. Super. 297, 126 A.2d 219
[Vol. 52.
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Initially, the developer determines whether streets or parks will be
offered for dedication, where they will be located, and how much of his
gross land-area they will consume. If the recorded plat reflects only th6
developer's decisions on these variables, his offer of dedication can ac-
curately be characterized as voluntary. By this definition, voluntary offers
of dedication for streets, parks, and other public uses are not infrequent.
When recordation of a plat is contingent upon approval by the local
planning agency, and perhaps also by the, local governing body, an ele-
ment of coercion is introduced into the dedication process.2 9 If the agency
to which a proposed plat must be submitted has express power to require
conformity to a master street or park plan, the final arrangement is more
accurately characterized as compulsory rather than voluntary. Neverthe-
less, courts sometimes invoke the fiction of voluntariness in sustaining
compulsory (i.e., uncompensated) dedication for public use.30
In upholding street width and location requirements imposed on a de-
veloper by the city of Detroit, the Supreme Court of Michigan stated
that "in theory at least, the owner of a subdivision voluntarily dedicates
sufficient land for streets in return for the advantage and privilege of hav-
ing his plat recorded." 31 The Supreme Court of Montana recently relied
on the Michigan case to support a decision upholding compulsory dedica-
tion for park and recreational purposes on the ground, inter alia, that the
developer's "act of attempting to secure approval of the plat was volun-
tary. There is no law requiring it to subdivide and sell its land by plat."32
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956); Fortson Inv. Co. v. Oklahoma City, 179 Okla. 473, 66 P.2d 96
(1937). Cf. Enchanting Homes, Inc. v. Rapanos, 143 N.W.2d 618 (Mich. App. 1966).
29 See, e.g., Standard Planning Act § 13:
Whenever a planning commission shall have adopted a major street plan of the territory
within its subdivision jurisdiction or part thereof, ... then no plat of a subdivision of
land within such territory or part shall be filed or recorded until it shall have been ap-
proved by such planning commission.
The subdivider's option to sell unplatted subdivision lots by metes and bounds description
is removed by § 16:
Whoever, being the owner or agent of the owner of any land located within a subdivision,
transfers . . . any land by reference to or exhibition of or by other use of a plat of a
subdivision, before such plat has been approved ... shall forfeit and pay a penalty of
$100 for each lot or parcel so transferred . . . and the description of such lot or parcel
by metes and bounds in the instrument of transfer. . . shall not exempt the transaction
from such penalties or from the remedies herein provided.
"Under many statutes," concludes a recent survey, "the subdivided land is rendered almost
useless to the developer until he complies with the regulations." Note, "Platting, Planning &
Protection-A Summary of Subdivision Statutes," 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1205, 1213 (1961). See
also Meli, "Subdivision Control in Wisconsin," 1953 Wis. L. Rev. 389, 399-405 (1953).
30 Cf. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 41, § 81Q (1966):
[N]o planning board shall impose, as a condition for the approval of a plan of a sub-
division, that any of the land within said subdivision be dedicated to the public use, or
conveyed or released ... for use as a public way, public park or playground, or for any
other public purpose, without just compensation to the owner thereof.
31 Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 472, 217 N.W. 58, 59 (1928).
32 Billings Properties, Inc. v.. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 32, 394 P.2d 182, 186
(1964). The statement seems inaccurate, in view of the requirement of Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann. § 11-601 (1957):
Any person, company, or corporation, who may lay out . '.1. any tract'of land within the
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An Oklahoma developer, complying with a planning commission re-
quirement that he dedicate five percent of his tract for public purposes,
conveyed two and one-half acres to Oklahoma City, after which his plat
was approved and recorded. He then brought an action in the alternative
to cancel the deed or recover the market value of the acreage conveyed.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court avoided passing on the validity of the
planning commission's requirement by phrasing the crucial issue in terms
of duress and undue influence.
The question here is not whether the rule of the Commission is a proper
police regulation, but rather, even if it is invalid, would its use by the city,
in convincing plaintiff that he should make a deed, constitute such menace,
duress, or undue influence as to warrant cancellation of the instrument? 33
The court then decided the issue against the developer because the lower
court's finding "that the deed was a voluntary dedication to the public"
was not "against the clear weight of the evidence."3' 4
Perhaps the Oklahoma developer committed a tactical error in exe-
cuting the conveyance. An action to compel recordation of his plat with-
out compliance with the commission's requirement would presumably
have required judicial consideration of the rule's validity. Nevertheless,
the characterization of his conveyance as "voluntary" seems to be insup-
portable in view of the planning commission's refusal to approve his plat
without it, and in consideration of the statutory requirement making com-
mission approval a prerequisite to plat recordation. 5
A more recent New Jersey appellate decision 8 reached a similar conclu-
sion of voluntariness, even though the planning board's minutes indicated
that tentative approval of the plat was granted "with the proviso that the
deed for a [two-acre] park be given to the City prior to filing for final
approval," and that the acting city manager assured the board that "I
would not sign the final map-and you will see that it was signed a week
or so later-until such time as I had received the deed."3" It is pure
sophistry to characterize as "voluntary" any exaction which is expressly
required as a condition precedent to plat approval, when plat approval
itself is a prerequisite for recordation.
limits of any city or town, or townsite, or transfer any lots, blocks or tracts therein, must
cause to be made an accurate survey and plat thereof, and cause the same to be recorded
in the office of the county clerk and recorder of the county in which such land lies.
The requirement for dedication of park land appears in § 11-602(9). Section 11-610 subjects
non-complying subdividers to a fine of $10 to $100 per lot sold in violation of the statute.
33 Fortson Inv. Co. v. Oklahoma City, 179 Okla. 473, 474, 66 P.2d 96, 98 (1937).
34 Ibid.
35 "All plans, plats, or replats of land . . . shall first be submitted to the regional planning
commission and approved by it before it [sic] shall be entitled to record in the office of the
county clerk." Okla. Stat. tit. 11, § 435 (1961).
36 Gregory Manor v. City of Clifton, 53 N.J. Super. 482, 147 A.2d 595 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1959).
37 Id. at 490, 147 A.2d at 599.
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey thwarted an attempt to invoke the
"voluntariness" fiction in the recent case of West Park Ave., Inc. v. Town-
ship of Ocean."8 There the developer purchased sixty lots in an established
subdivision with the intention of constructing dwellings upon them. It ap-
plied for building permits, but was informed by officials of the munici-
pality that no building permits or certificates of occupancy would be issued
unless arrangements were made for payment of the sum of $300 per house
into a trust or sinking fund for capital improvements to educational
facilities. There was no municipal ordinance authorizing this require-
ment, nor, according to the supreme court's interpretation, did the sub-
division control enabling act authorize such exactions. 39 Issuance of build-
ing permits was conditioned upon the developer's written agreement to
pay $300 into the fund at the closing of the sale transaction for each
dwelling. After $13,700 had been paid pursuant to this agreement, the
developer brought an action for its recovery. Although the municipality
finally conceded that the exactions were unauthorized,' it insisted upon
enforcement of the agreement.
In a strongly worded opinion, the court sustained the developer's con-
tention that the agreement was unenforceable because it was made under
duress.41 The trial court had held in favor of the municipality on the
ground that the payments were voluntary as a matter of law because of
the developer's failure to institute legal action before they were made. In
rejecting this conclusion, the court took a realistic view of the developer's
position: "Plaintiff feared it could not survive if its project stood still
88 48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (,1966).
89 "It is not our purpose to prejudge the constitutional power of the Legislature to
authorize municipalities to impose charges such as the one here involved. . . . Rather our
point is that the Legislature has not committed that authority to local government." Id. at
127, 224 A.2d at 4.
The enabling act, N.J. Rev. Stat. § 40:55-1.21 (Supp. 1964), authorizes municipalities to
require developers to install or furnish "street grading, pavement, gutters, curbs, sidewalks,
street lighting, shade trees, surveyor's monuments, water mains, culverts, storm sewers,
sanitary sewers or other means of sewage disposal, drainage structures, and such other sub-
division improvements as the municipal governing body may find necessary in the public
interest." The court apparently utilized the canon of ejusdem generis to reach its conclusion
that the statute does not encompass the furnishing of educational improvements outside the
subdivision. It held that, with respect to educational facilities, the only authorization is that
provided in N.J. Rev. Stat. 1 40:55-1.20 (Supp. 1964) for reservation of school and park
sites for a period of one year, during which the subdivider is not permitted to construct im-
provements. If, within the year, the municipality decides to use the land so reserved, pro-
ceedings to acquire it through the power of eminent domain must be instituted. Thus, the only
adverse effect upon the developer is the uncompensated tying up of part of his land
for a period of one year. See Cunningham, "Control of Land Use in New Jersey Under the
1953 Planning Statutes," 15 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 22-24, 39 (1960).
40 It did so upon oral argument before the Supreme Court. West Park Ave., Inc. v. Town-
ship of Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 127, 224 A.2d '1, 4 (1966).
41 The court characterized the payments as "illegally extorted," via "the guise of 'volun-
tary' contributions with spurious 'agreements' to make them stick." Id. at 128, 224 A.2d
at 4. Similar, though less emotionally charged, holdings are Gordon v. Village of Wayne, 370
Mich. 329, 121 N.W.2d 823 (1963); Ridgemont Dev. Co. v. City of E. Detroit, 358 Mich.
387, 100 N.W.2d 301 (1960).
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during a period of litigation. It also sensed a danger of hostile enforcement
of ordinances bearing upon the construction of homes." 42 The court re-
fused, however, to speculate on the validity of equalization fees where
authorized.
Despite the possibility of adverse judicial decisions such as West Park
Ave., it appears that many municipalities have, without a formal require-
ment of dedication (or even authority to require dedication), "persuaded"
developers to make "voluntary" offers of land for public uses such as
parks and recreation areas.43 One means of persuasion which has been
used is bargaining over (or, more realistically, threatening to withhold),
municipal services such as water and sewer connections. While this tech-
nique has been held invalid where the municipality is under a duty to
provide such services,44 it can be quite effective in situations where there
is no such duty." Another device, which deserves fuller treatment than is
possible here, is the requirement of replatting (including compliance with
existing planning regulations) as a precondition to changes in zoning
classification.46
Even in the absence of legal authority to require dedication of land for
public uses, municipalities clearly occupy a strong tactical position to re-
quire such dedication prior to plat approval. First, the value of the land
dedicated may be less than the cost of legal proceedings to challenge the
requirement. Second, the entire subdivision project is delayed during the
42 West Park Ave., Inc. v. Township of Ocean, supra note 40 at 124, 224 A.2d at 2.
43 This type of coercion has apparently existed in some areas for a number of years. A
survey made more than thirty years ago revealed an Oklahoma City requirement that sub-
dividers dedicate not less than five per cent of the gross subdivision area (exclusive of
streets) for "public use." The survey concluded that, "while the statement is explicit in re-
quiring open-space dedications, regulation is in fact not so vigorous. Instead, persuasive
methods have been used with success in securing dedications, but the [Planning] Commission
has 'not sought to do this by force of law.'" Lautner, Subdivision Regulations 179 (1941).
See also Hubbard & Hubbard, Our Cities Today and Tomorrow (1929), the "dominant note"
of which has been said to be the revelation "that dedications in many cases are secured suc-
cessfully by means of persuasion." Lautner, supra, at 184.
One commentator notes that "a few communities will offer the developer a bonus of addi-
tional lots if he dedicates recreational land." Frey, "Subdivision Control and Planning,"
1961 U. Ill. L.F. 411, 442 (1961). Professor Haar confirms the continuing vitality of such
methods with the statement that "individual negotiations and compromises are a hallmark
of this form of land use control" (i.e., subdivision control). Haar, "The Social Control of
Urban Space," in Wingo (ed.), Cities and Space 175,189 (1963).
With reference to the legality of such "negotiated concessions," see Cutler, "Legal and
Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on the Urban Fringe," 1961 Wis. L.
Rev. 370, 392 (1961).
44 See Reid Dev. Corp. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 10 NJ. 229, 89 A.2d 667
(1952).
45 See City of Colorado Springs v. Kitty Hawk Dev. Co., 154 Colo. 535, 392 P.2d 467
(1964).
46 See, e.g., Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 345 P.2d 983 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), rev'd,
54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal. Reptr. 493 (1960) ; Hudson Oil Co. v. City of Wichita, 193
Kan. 623, 396 P.2d 271 (1964) ; Murrell v. Wolff, 408 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1966); Alperin v.
'Township of Middletown, 91 N.J. Super. 190, 219 A.2d 628 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1966) ; Coe v. City
of Albuquerque, 418 P.2d 545 (N.M. 1966).
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slow process of trial and appeal, and the profitability of the enterprise
may be dependent upon speedy completion of the subdivision. Finally,
the developer may submit out of fear of punitive delays in approving sub-
division plats of other tracts he owns in areas subject to the same planning
control authority.
Others besides the municipal planning board can exert irresistible pres-
sures on the developer. For instance, lenders may require recordation of
the subdivision plat and compliance with public use dedication "sugges-
tions" as a precondition to extension of a financing commitment4 Or
the prospective lender or insurer may actually impose its own open-space
requirements as a prerequisite to such a commitment. Perhaps the most
striking example of the latter is FHA's land-use intensity formula.4 8
Submission to such persuasion is "voluntary" only in the sense that the
developer believes the projected subdivision will be sufficiently profitable
to absorb the loss of dedicated land. In theory, of course, the developers
are free to "shop around" for other lenders, insurers, or land in other
municipalities with more lenient planning requirements. But practical con-
siderations may render even this "freedom" illusory. For example, it has
been said that, for residential homes selling for less than $22,000, FHA
and VA approval are a virtual necessity "from a marketability point of
view." 49
Confrontation of the obvious constitutional issues presented by com-
pulsory dedication of land for public use, however, cannot be postponed
indefinitely. Inevitably, courts are required to determine the validity of
authorized, but obviously compulsory, regulations. Some courts have ac-
cepted the argument that plat recordation is a privilege rather than a right
and, hence, that reasonable conditions may be placed upon the grant
of the privilege.
B. The "Privilege" of Recordation
Citations of authority supporting the privilege rationale usually begin
with Ross v. Goodfellow 0 That case involved the interpretation of an
1888 statute empowering the commissioners of the District of Columbia
to regulate the subdivision and platting of all land in the District. 1
47 A recent analysis confirms that, at the "economic feasibility study" stage (i.e., before
the decision to purchase land for development), a developer usually must submit his plans
to and receive the approval of his sources of financing and their insurers or guarantors. The
FHA marketability study is of particular significance. Weiss et al., Residential Developer
Decisions 52-54 (1966).
48 See Hanke, 'Planned Unit Development and Land Use Intensity," 114 U. Pa. L. Rev.
15 (1965).
49 Weiss, supra note 47, at 52.
50 7 App. D.C. 1 (Ct. App. 1895).
51 25 Stat. 451 (1888).
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The statute provided that no plat could be recorded in the District with-
out express authorization of the commissioners, and that subdivision con-
trol orders promulgated by them should have the force and effect of law
thirty days after publication. Pursuant to this authority, the commis-
sioners promulgated orders requiring that streets in proposed subdivisions
outside the cities of Washington and Georgetown should, as far as prac-
ticable, conform to the width and alignment of the streets and avenues of
Washington. The regulations further provided that existing streets or ave-
nues of the City of Washington might be deflected beyond the city limits
where the commissioners should deem it advisable.
The dispute arose over the commissioners' extension and deflection of
Delaware Avenue to include approximately three acres of a proposed sub-
division. Had the Avenue been extended in a straight line, it would not
have touched this land. The commissioners, however, deemed the deflec-
tion advisable "in view of the location of the metropolitan branch of the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and for other reasons .... ,,52 Accordingly,
they denied approval of a proposed subdivision plat which did not indi-
cate dedication of land for the deflected extension of Delaware Avenue.
The subdividers brought an action for mandamus to compel recordation
and were successful in the trial court, the judge holding that the commis-
sioners had no authority to deflect Delaware Avenue and require the sub-
dividers to dedicate land as a prerequisite to recordation.
The court of appeals reversed on the ground that Congress, in requir-
ing the commissioners to secure conformity with the general plan of the
city, did not intend "a rigid extension on the exact alignment of existing
streets and avenues. 5 3 Thus, the details of the general plan were questions
of fact to be determined by the commissioners, and their findings were
not subject to judicial review. 4 The court concluded that Congress had
invested the commissioners with a nonreviewable discretion in the loca-
tion of street extensions for which they could require dedication as a
prerequisite to approval of subdivision plats.5
52 Ross v. Goodfellow, 7 App. D.C. 1, 6 (Ct. App. 1895).
53 Id. at 8.
54 The act of 1888 charges [the commissioners] . . . with the duty of ascertaining a
fact and requires them to pass judgment upon it; and no matter how erroneous suchjudgment might be, the courts would have no power to revise it, because no jurisdiction
to review the decisions of the Commissioners, in such cases, has been conferred upon the
courts.
Id. at 10.
55 [We are of the opinion that it was the purpose of the act of '1888 to repose some
discretion in the Commissioners with respect to the location of the extensions of the
avenues whenever called upon to admit a plat to record. That this discretion might
sometimes even be unjustly and oppressively exercised, was a matter for Congress alone
to consider.
Id. at 11.
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The subdividers in Ross had contended that, even if the commissioners
had the power to propose a deflection of Delaware Avenue, they were not
authorized to condition plat approval upon the dedication of land for the
proposed street. The court rejected this contention.
[I] t must be remembered that each owner has the undoubted right to lay
off his land in any manner that he pleases, or not to subdivide it at all. He
cannot be made to dedicate streets and avenues to the public. If public
necessity demands part of his land for highways, it can be taken only by
condemnation and payment of its value. But he has no corresponding right
to have his plat of subdivision so made admitted to the records.
In providing for public record Congress can accompany the privilege
with conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons. In providing
for such record in the Act of 1888, Congress sought to subserve the public
interest and convenience by requiring practical conformity in all sub-
divisions of land into squares, streets and avenues, with the general plan
of the city as originally established, and this, regardless of the fact that
it might, in some instances, practically coerce the dedication of streets to
public use which would otherwise have to be paid for 56
This recitation is unaccompanied by citation of authority. The opinion
appears to rest solely on the conclusion that the action of the commis-
sioners was authorized by Congress, and that their exercise of this au-
thority was not subject to judicial review. The crucial issue-whether the
required dedication constituted a taking for which compensation is re-
quired by the fifth amendment-apparently was not raised by the sub-
dividers.57 It is thus improper to cite Ross as authority for the proposition
that compulsory dedication of streets as a condition of plat recordation
is not prohibited by the fifth amendment.
Several years later the commissioners established minimum lot size
regulations, which required that all lots in recorded subdivisions be no
less than sixteen feet wide and fifty feet deep. In MacFarland v. Miller,8
the owner of a lot 32' by 46' 4" desired to construct two dwellings on his
property, each sixteen feet wide and thirty-six feet deep. These con-
templated structures were in compliance with all applicable building code
regulations, except one which prohibited the erection of two or more dwel-
lings unless the land on which they were to stand had been subdivided
such that each house would stand on a separate lot. The owner attempted
to record a plat showing two 16' x 46' 4" lots, but was denied recordation
because of the violation of the minimum-size requirement. He was then
denied a building permit because of the failure to subdivide.
50 Id. at 10-11.
57 On motion for rehearing, the court held that Ross was not a case "in which is drawn
in question the validity of a treaty or statute of or an authority exercised under the United
States . . . ." Id. at 15.
58 18 App. D.C. 554 (Ct. App. 1901).
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His proceeding by mandamus to compel issuance of the building permit
was successful. The court of appeals upheld the refusal to record his plat
on the authority of Ross, but held that he could not be compelled to sub-
divide. It further held that, since his proposed structures complied with
the building code, the commissioners had no authority to deny the permit.
This case raises disturbing questions about the privilege rationale. For
instance, suppose the subdivider in Ross had, without seeking to record a
plat, simply "laid off" his land in some manner so as to provide reasonable
access to each lot but did not dedicate three acres for the extension of
Delaware Avenue. Does MacFarland indicate that the commissioners
would have had no power to compel dedication, because "no penalty is
provided for failure to obey the [commissioners'] regulations beyond the
denial of record?" '6 Reading Ross and MacFarland together, the "privi-
lege" rationale becomes simply a variant of the "voluntariness" doctrine:
the owner is free to subdivide in any way he chooses, so long as he does
not seek to record a plat of his subdivision; if he does elect to record,
however, then he must comply with the prescribed subdivision regulations.
This suggests that the "privilege" rationale is inapplicable to situations
where recordation is mandatory rather than elective. Under the elective
system, an owner has three alternatives: (1) subdivide according to regu-
lations and record a plat; (2) subdivide in some other manner, without
recordation; (3) not subdivide. With a mandatory platting requirement,
however, the second alternative disappears Thus, the severity of such
regulations may be relatively insignificant where compliance is at the
option of the owner, but cannot be ignored where compliance is manda-
tory.
Since the application of Ross and MacFarland to compulsory recorda-
tion is doubtful, and since neither case raised the question of the effect of
the fifth amendment on the scope of permissible subdivision regulation,
the "privilege" rationale expounded in these cases may be of limited ap-
plication.
The next significant case in the development of the "privilege" rationale
was Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit.6'1 There the subdivider sub-
mitted a proposed plat showing streets whose width conformed to existing
streets in previously recorded subdivisions but were narrower than the
width prescribed by the city's master street plan.' When recordation was
59 Id. at 564.
60 See note 29 supra.
61 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
62 The original Michigan acts regulating plat recordation and vacation dated from 1839.
Until 1925, municipalities had no power to require dedication except where necessary to
assure conformity with streets and alleys of adjoining subdivisions. Mich. Comp. Laws, ch.
74 § 3350 (1915). See Campan v. Board of County Auditors, 198 Mich. 468, 164 N.W. 369
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denied because of noncompliance with the master plan, the owner sought
a writ of mandamus to compel acceptance of the plat, contending that the
increased width requirement was invalid as an attempted taking for
public use without compensation.
While conceding that existing streets could not be widened without pay-
ment for compensation, the court distinguished the situation under review.
Here the city is not trying to compel a dedication. It cannot compel the
plaintiff to subdivide its property or to dedicate any part of it for streets.
It can, however, impose any reasonable condition which must be complied
with before the subdivision is accepted for record. In theory at least, the
owner of a subdivision voluntarily dedicates sufficient land for streets in
return for the advantage and privilege of having his plat recorded. Unless
he does so, the law gives him no right to have it recorded.6a
This was followed by a supporting quotation from Ross.4
It should be noted that, since Michigan law permitted conveyance of
subdivision lots by metes and bounds, recordation was not a legal neces-
sity.6 Thus, application of the privilege rationale seems proper. Yet the
court was unwilling to rely solely upon the "privilege" rationale. The
exaction was upheld alternatively as a proper exercise of the police power.
C. The Police Power Rationale of Subdivision Control
The Ross court deferred to administrative discretion in the imposition
of regulations designed to assure conformity with the general plan for
the District of Columbia. But in Ridgefield Land Co. the Supreme Court
of Michigan expressly limited the power of the city to the imposition
of reasonable conditions on its grant of the privilege of recordation, saying
that:
The streets in the City of Detroit, as elsewhere, were originally laid
out for the horse and buggy age. They are too narrow for the present traffic
conditions. It has become necessary for the general convenience and the
public safety to widen them and to prevent others of the same kind from
being established. Because of this necessity, there is nothing unreasonable
in the demand of the city that the streets designated in the plaintiff's plat
shall be of such a width as to conform to the general street plan. It has been
determined that streets of a certain width are necessary to accommodate
(1917). A 1925 amendment, however, required municipalities to refuse recordation of sub-
division plats unless "all highways, streets and alleys conform to the general plan that may
have been adopted by the governing body of the municipality for the width and location of
highways, streets, and alleys." Mich. Pub. Acts. 1925, no. 360 § 1.
63 Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 472, 217 N.W. 58, 59 (1928).
64 The court quoted the passage which appears in the text accompanying note 56, supra.
65 The statute imposed a penalty of ten dollars per lot upon the sale of subdivision lots
by reference to an unrecorded plat. There was no penalty for sale of such lots by metes and
bounds description. Municipalities were, however, authorized to prepare and record plats of
previously unrecorded subdivisions; for tax purposes, such plats were treated the same as if
they had been recorded by the subdivider. Mich. Comp. Laws, ch. 74, 1 3350 (1915). Since
the proposed subdivision consisted of eighty acres, however, sale by plat reference may have
been considered a practical necessity.
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the traffic. They are necessary for the public safety, and therefore the right
to provide for them is within the police power of the city.66
The opinion thus indicates that, when the reasonableness of subdivision
control regulation is at issue, the ultimate determinant of validity should
be neither voluntariness nor privilege, but the police power. This suggests
two questions. First, why impose a reasonableness requirement where
the owner is permitted to subdivide without recordation? On this matter,
the opinion is silent. Second, if reasonableness must be a function of
"necessity," what is the test and how is it applied? The court refers to a
self-evident relationship between street width and public safety and
indicates that this relationship justifies the exercise of the police power.
But this begs the question. The relationship exists with respect both to
existing streets and to proposed streets, but the opinion explicitly concedes
that the police power does not justify the widening of existing streets
without compensating those whose land is taken for that purpose. The
opinion furnishes no explanation for the distinction. Nevertheless, sub-
sequent to Ridgefield Land Co., the test of validity of subdivision control
regulations has often been said to depend upon whether or not they con-
stitute a "reasonable exercise of the police power." In the formulation and
application of tests of reasonableness, however, the courts have expressed
divergent views. 7
Perhaps confusion is inevitable. The police power is, after all, deliber-
ately expansible to meet emerging public needs.0 8 In particular, the scope
of the "public welfare" branch of the police power has expanded enor-
mously in recent years.69 In addition, more and more activities, formerly
thought to be private in nature, have been recognized as "affected with a
public interest.""' Therefore, it is relatively simple to relate virtually any
66 Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, supra note 63, at 472, 217 N.W. at 59.
67 See note 9, supra.
68 The classic articulation is, of course, that of Mr. Justice Holmes:
It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public
needs.... It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the
prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately
necessary to the public welfare.
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911). For discussion of the "dynamic na-
ture" of the police power, see 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 24.08 (3d ed. 1949).
69 See Haar, The Social Control of Urban Space, in Wingo (ed.), Cities and Space 175,
176-78 (1963).
70 The assertion that, when private property is "affected with a public interest, it ceases
to be juris privati," originated with Hale, De Portibus Maris, in 1 Hargrave, Tracts Relative
to the Law of England 78 (1787). It was utilized in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876),
to sustain state economic regulation. The opinion provides this elaboration:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it
of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes
his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the
public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created.
Id. at 126.
This doctrine was applied in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), to sustain a Virginia
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type of subdivision control regulation -to the public health, safety, or wel-
fare, at least in their broadest conception. Nevertheless, the constitutional
guarantees of due process and compensation for property taken for public
use may not be ignored. The task of delineating the proper scope of the
police power has, therefore, fallen to the judiciary.
II
SUBDMSION CONTROL: METHODS AND TECHNIQUES
The police power is an inherent attribute of state sovereignty,7 the
plenary exercise of which rests in the discretion of the state legislatures.72
It is well settled that the police power can be delegated to political subdivi-
sions of the state, so long as adequate standards for its exercise are pre-
scribed and procedural safeguards are provided.73 State courts have been
reluctant to uphold local exercise of police power for subdivision control in
the absence of express authorization, usually in the form of an enabling
act. 4
It is easy to characterize a decision which holds some novel regulation
or exaction to be ultra vires as a judicial failure to confront directly the
more difficult constitutional questions; however, such a conclusion is
probably unfair. If the scope of the police power is to be expanded to meet
a newly-asserted public need, the state legislature, rather than the court,
is the appropriate body to recognize the need and to take appropriate
action to meet it. Thus, a finding that the power to require exactions
statute requiring the removal of red cedar trees within a certain proximity of apple orchards.
The "preponderant public concern" represented by the commercial value of apples was held
to justify the exercise of the police power to destroy a competing private interest. Id. at 279.
For development of the conception of subdivision control as business or economic regula-
tion, see text accompanying notes 228-30 infra.
71 Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909).
72 With respect to economic regulation, the scope of legislative power bad been aptly
described as follows:
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other con-
stitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably
be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted
to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when
it is declared by the legislature, to override it.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
73 Delegation is usually accomplished by legislative grant in the form of statute or
municipal charter. 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 24.38 (3d ed. 1949). In some
home-rule states, delegation of some powers is effected by provisions of the state constitu-
tion; these powers are beyond state legislative control. See 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corpora-
tions § 4.28 (3d ed. rev. 1966).
74 E.g., Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957) ; Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960) ; Coronado
Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962) ; Ridgemont Dev. Co. v.
City of E. Detroit, 358 Mich. 387, 100 N.W.2d 301 (1960); Midtown Properties, Inc.
v. Township of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, 172 A.2d 40 (Super. Ct. L. 1961) ; Reggs Homes,
Inc. v. Dickerson, 16 Misc. 2d 732, 179 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1958), aff'd,
8 App. Div. 2d 640, 186 N.Y.S.2d 215 (2d Dep't 1959); Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99,
359 P.2d 108 (1961).
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of developers has been delegated to the local legislature or planning com-
mission is prerequisite to judicial consideration of the constitutionality of
an implementing ordinance.
In reviewing the cases which have considered the validity of specific
types of subdivision control exactions, it is convenient to employ three
classifications: streets, utilities, and other public uses such as educational
and recreational facilities.
A. Compulsory Dedication for Streets
We have already noted that division of a tract into more than a few
lots usually requires new streets to provide convenient access. 75 If de-
velopers could determine in their sole discretion the width and arrange-
ment of streets within their subdivisions, the likely result would be a con-
fusing, inefficient street pattern for the community. The Standard City
Planning Enabling Act therefore authorizes municipal planning commis-
sions to promulgate subdivision regulations providing for:
[T]he proper relation of streets in location to other existing or planned
streets and to the master plan, for adequate and convenient open spaces
for traffic, utilities, access of fire fighting apparatus, recreation, light and
air, and for the avoidance and congestion of population, including minimum
width and area lots.76
The sole prerequisite to a commission's exercise of subdivision control
authority is the adoption of a major street plan.77 As the explanatory note
to section 13 of the Act indicates, "the planning commission is empowered
to exercise its control of subdivisions only after it shall have developed
at least a major street plan for the territory to be controlled. ' 78 Although
many states have adopted enabling acts which are not based on the Stand-
ard Planning Act, all assume that coordination of street alignment is a
primary function of subdivision regulation.
Under the Standard Act the act of subdividing constitutes the source
of the planning commission's jurisdiction, rather than a developer's sub-
mission of a proposed plat with the request that it be admitted to public
record. The developer becomes subject to the planning commission's regu-
lations regardless of the form of transfer or type of descripton utilized.7"
75 See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
76 Standard Planning Act § 14.
77 Standard Planning Act § 13.
78 Standard Planning Act § 26 n.66. [Emphasis added.] A later note explains that, while
coordination of streets is "one of the primary purposes of giving control of land subdivision
to planning commissions," their powers are "not limited to this purpose . . . 2' Standard
Planning Act '§ 27 n.70.
79 This provision, the significance of which has apparently not been fully appreciated, sub-
jects the developer to the penalties described in note 80 infra, even though the subdivision lot
is described by metes and bounds rather than by reference to an unapproved plat. Standard
Planning Act § 16.
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Failure to conform to those regulations subjects him to fine and injunctive
procedures. 8 It should be obvious that the "voluntariness" and "privilege"
rationales are incompatible with the Standard Planning Act and any other
enabling act containing similar provisions. Regulations adopted pursuant
to such authorization must derive their validity from the police power, and
no other source.
There is a great potential for disagreement between developer and plan-
ning commission over the necessity or propriety of subdivision control
exactions, especially in situations where a nonsubdividing landowner
clearly cannot be required to furnish land without being compensated. A
prime example is provided by those situations wherein the planning com-
mission requires dedication of land for streets whose width exceeds that of
existing connecting streets.
This problem was presented in the leading case of Ayres v. City Coun-
cil,81 where the subdivider owned thirteen acres of land in the shape of a
long, narrow right triangle, bounded on two sides by thoroughfares, which
intersected at the apex. (The tract was less than 500 feet wide at the base
and extended some 2,400 feet to the apex.) The owner proposed to sub-
divide this tract into ten residential lots, one business lot, and one lot for
religious use. A nearby cross street, sixty feet in width, would have
bisected the tract if extended through the developer's land. On his pro-
posed plat, the subdivider dedicated a strip of land sixty feet in width for
the extension of this street, with the business and religious use lots abutting
it on either side. The planning commission, however, conditioned plat
approval upon the dedication of a strip eighty feet in width for the exten-
sion of this street. The subdivider, challenging the reasonableness of the
condition, brought an action of mandamus to compel recordation of his
plat.82
The Supreme Court of California upheld the requirement, stating that:
The contentions respecting the required width of the Seventy-seventh
Street extension will not be further discussed except to note that the pro-
posed business and religious uses of the respective abutting lots and the
fact that Seventy-seventh is the only street to transverse the tract between
Sepulveda Boulevard and Arizona Avenue, sufficiently support the con-
80 The Standard Planning Act contains several enforcement provisions. Any developer who
sells or agrees to sell land by reference to an unapproved plat is subject to a fine of $100
per lot, and any impending transfer may be enjoined at the suit of the municipal corporation.
Ibid. See note 29 supra. Some state enabling acts provide, in addition, that transfers in
violation of the act are voidable at the option of the transferee. See, e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 26.508(1) (1953); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 236.31(3) (1957). A recent New Mexico enactment
declares such offending transfers void. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-19-13(13) (Supp. 1965).
81 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
82 "Any subdivider or person claiming to be aggrieved by the decision of a governing
body may within 90 days after the rendering of the decision bring a special proceeding in
the superior court to determine the reasonableness of the decision." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§ 11525 (West 1964).
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clusion that the required width is reasonably related to the potential traffic
needs. 83
That activities conducted on the lots in question would generate additional
traffic is obvious. The owners of land abutting the existing sixty-foot
street probably also generated traffic; but under existing law they could
be forced to provide land for its widening only through exercise of the
power of eminent domain.8 4 The court's opinion fails to broach two major
issues. First, why is the subdivider excluded from the constitutional
guarantee of just compensation in this case? Second, assuming that the
subdivider can be required to dedicate land for streets within his sub-
division to a width exceeding that of existing connecting streets, what test
is to be employed in judicial review of the reasonableness of such require-
ments? The second issue suggests two further inquiries. (1) To what
extent may the planning commission rely on forecasts of future traffic
needs-in requiring dedication for streets? 5 (2) What consideration should
be given to the extent of the burden imposed on the subdivider?" Ap-
parently, the court was satisfied with upholding the requirement on the
basis that the street extension was located entirely within the owner's tract
and would receive traffic generated from within his subdivision.
In Ayres, the court also upheld three other conditions which the plan-
ning commission had imposed upon the developer: dedication of a ten-foot
strip for widening the boulevard located along one side of the tract;
restriction of an additional ten-foot strip along this boulevard to the
planting of trees and shrubbery in order to prevent "direct ingress and
egress"; 7 and dedication of a small triangle in the intersection of the two
thoroughfares at the apex of the tract for the purpose of eliminating it
as traffic hazard. The subdivider argued that these conditions were un-
authorized by the enabling act, which refers only to regulation of "design
and improvement" of subdivisions 8 His argument was rejected on the
83 Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 39, 207 P.2d 1, 6 (1949).
84 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 32.04, 32.62 (3d ed. rev. 1964).
85 "Nor is it a valid objection to say that the [disputed exactions] ... contemplate future
as well as more immediate needs. Potential as well as present population factors affecting
the subdivision and the neighborhood generally are appropriate for consideration." Ayres v.
City Council, supra note 83, at 41, 207 P.2d at 7. This statement is helpful only in its
affirmation of the appropriateness of consideration of such factors; it offers no suggestion as
to the weight they should be accorded.
86 E.g., if the subdivider's land measures only three hundred feet in length and his pro-
posed plat shows five sixty-foot lots, an exaction of even sixty feet for street extension through
the middle of his tract may impose an unreasonable burden. In Ayres, the developer did not
even contest the validity of this requirement.
87 Ayres v. City Council, supra note 83, at 34, 207 P.2d at 3.
88 In the absence of a subdivision control ordinance, California municipalities are em-
powered to require only "streets and drainage ways properly located and of adequate width."
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 11551 (West ,1964). But every city and county is required to adopt
ordinances "regulating and controlling the design and improvement of subdivisions." Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 11525 (West 1964). The original (1943) definitions of "design" and
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somewhat surprising ground that power to impose these requirements was
not expressly excluded by the Subdivision Map Act or the city's charter 9
The subdivider further contended that the benefit of these exactions
would inure primarily to the city rather than to his subdivision, and
thus that he should receive compensation for them. The court replied:
A sufficient answer is that the proceeding here involved is not one in eminent
domain, nor is the city seeking to exercise that power. It is the petitioner
who is seeking to acquire the advantages of lot subdivision and upon him
rests the duty of compliance with reasonable conditions for design, dedica-
tion, improvement and restrictive use of the land so as to conform to the
safety and general welfare of the lot owners in the subdivision and of the
public.90
This statement is disappointing. Obviously, the form in which the pro-
ceeding is conducted should not determine applicability of the constitu-
tional guarantee of just compensation." The facile verbalization that the
subdivider has a duty to comply with "reasonable conditions" merely
obscures the central problem-how is "reasonableness" to be determined?
"improvement" were: "'Design' refers to street alignment, grades and widths, alignment
and widths of easements and right of ways for drainage and sanitary sewers and minimum
lot area and width." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 11510 (West 1964).
"Improvement" refers to only such street work and utilities to be installed, or agreed to
be installed by the subdivider on the land to be used for public or private streets, high-
ways, ways, and easements, as are necessary for the general use of the lot owners in the
subdivision and local neighborhood traffic and drainage needs as a condition precedent to
the approval and acceptance of the final map thereof.
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 1151.1 (West 1964).
A 1965 amendment added the following sentence to section 11510: "Design also includes
land to be dedicated for park or recreational uses." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §11510 (WestSupp. 1966). An amendment to § 11546 expressly authorizes dedication of land or payment of
cash in lieu thereof for park or recreation purposes. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 1,1546 (West
Supp. 1966). The apparent effect of those enactments is to render inapplicable the holding
in Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957), that
such exactions are not authorized.
89 Where as here no specific restriction or limitation on the city's power is contained in
the charter, and none forbidding the particular conditions [i.e., the exactions imposed]is included either in the Subdivision Map Act or the city ordinances, it is proper to
conclude that conditions are lawful which are not inconsistent with the map act and
the ordinances and are reasonably required by the subdivision type and use as related to
the character of local and neighborhood planning and traffic conditions.
Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 37, 207 P.2d 1, 5 (1949).90 Id. at 42, 207 P.2d at 7.
91 The duty to pay compensation is not limited to situations in which the power of
eminent domain is expressly invoked through conventional condemnation proceedings. Agrowing body of law recognizes that landowners have a cause of action against public
authorities for diminution in the value of their property resulting from activities which
constitute so substantial an injury or interference as to amount to a "taking." These proceed-ings are sometimes referred to as "inverse condemnation." See ,11 McQuillin, Municipal Corpo-
rations § 32.132 (a) (3d ed. rev. 1964). Inverse condemnation proceedings against the federal
government are authorized by the Tucker Act, 62 Stat. 933 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2)(1962). See United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958).
Landowners threatened with unlawful seizure of their property may enjoin a public
authority from taking possession until constitutional and statutory requirements have been
met. 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 32.129 (3d ed. rev. 1964). The action by man-
damus to compel recordation of a plat without compliance with subdivision control exactions
seems closely analogous; in effect, the plaintiff asks the court to prohibit the municipality
from acquiring his property otherwise than by eminent domain proceedings.
1967]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
The court clearly indicated that the planning commission may properly
consider the potential traffic volume over the new streets, whether gener-
ated from within or without the subdivision, in determining what must
be dedicated.
In a growing metropolitan area each additional subdivision adds to the traffic
burden. It is no defense to the conditions imposed in a subdivision map
proceeding that their fulfillment will incidentally also benefit the city as a
whole. Nor is it a valid objection to say that the conditions contemplate
future as well as more immediate needs. Potential as well as present popu-
lation factors affecting the subdivision and the neighborhood generally are
appropriate for consideration 92
But this speaks only to the propriety of the commission's criteria for im-
posing the exactions. It does not reveal the relative weight which reason-
ably may be given to each of those criteria. On this question, perhaps the
most influential determinant of the decision in the Ayres case was the fol-
lowing:
In fact, it may be said that the petitioner's position would seem to be
greatly improved by this type of subdivision and its related requirements
in conformity with neighborhood planning and zoning. [The regular design
of subdivision] . . . would have required dedication and improvement by
the petitioner of lateral service roads and lanes for diversion of the local
traffic to and from the main artery which the evidence shows would have
used more land than for the widening and planning strips, and would have
increased the cost of the improvements to be installed by the petitioner. The
record indicates that the so-called cellular design was generally adopted be-
cause it interfered less with the free flow of traffic, minimized the hazards on
the main thoroughfares, and reduced land dedication and improvement ex-
pense. . . . In fact, the petitioner makes no objection to that design as such.
It is to be assumed that he prefers it with the resulting savings in land and
cost.
9 3
Apparently, the reasonableness of these exactions was determined by bal-
ancing the detriment imposed upon the owner against the benefit conferred
upon the community. The court found that the required design actually
imposed no burden upon the subdivider; in fact, it resulted in savings to
him. In the light of this finding, it is hardly surprising that the planning
commission's requirements were upheld.
While five justices concurred in the opinion of the court, a vigorous
dissenting opinion presented the conclusions of two of their brethren that,
except for the widening of the cross street, the planning commission re-
quirements were unauthorized by the Subdivision Map Act and constituted
a taking of the petitioner's land for which compensation was required. 94
92 Ayres v. City Council, supra note 89, at 41, 207 P.2d at 7.
93 Id. at 40, 207 P.2d at 6-7.
94 The dissenter disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the requirements of dedica-
tion for the boulevard widening and the planting strip, and dedication of the small triangle,
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On the latter point, the dissenters drew a distinction between police-power
regulation and improvements for which compensation must be paid.
If a legislative body finds that public necessity requires the taking of prop-
erty for highways, for streets, for a water supply, for recreational areas,
for hospitals, for schools or other public buildings, or for a myriad of other
public purposes, the court must accept such a finding as conclusive. If
such a finding is all that is necessary to warrant the exercise of the police
power, there will be no occasion for the state or other public agency ever
paying for any private property taken or damaged for a public improve-
ment.... Thus, under the theory advanced in the majority opinion, in any
case that the power of eminent domain may be properly exercised, the
police power could also be invoked with the result that no compensation
could be recovered. Although it is difficult to charter [sic] the dividing line
between the exercise of the two powers, it should be said that police power
operates in the field of regulation, except possibly in some cases of public
emergency, such as a fire, where buildings may be destroyed, rather in the
taking of property for some public improvement. 5
This formulation is not helpful, because it makes no attempt to indicate
the basis upon which the distinction between "regulation" and "improve-
ment" should be drawn. In fact, it is doubtful that the dissenting justices
even attempted to apply it. Widening Seventy-seventh Street by twenty
feet seems to be as much of an "improvement" as broadening Sepulveda
Boulevard or requiring dedication of the apex of the owner's tract. The
dissenters, however, concurred in affirming the requirement for widening
Seventy-seventh Street. 6
Ayres has been followed in a number of subsequent cases concerning
compulsory dedication of land for streets. Unfortunately, it is usually cited
were consistent with the statutory authorization for control of subdivision "design and
improvement." (See definitions in note 88 supra.) They construed the statute as authorizing
exactions only for streets within the subdivision, not on its periphery, concluding that: "It
cannot be contended seriously by anyone that the Legislature intended the subdivider to
improve, at his own expense, a state highway such as Sepulveda Boulevard, and a street
such as Arizona." Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 57, 207 P.2d 1, '16 (1949). But similar
requirements were upheld in Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311
(1941).
At the trial, it had been conceded that the proposed Los Angeles master street plan had
not as yet been approved by the city council. From this fact, the dissenters reasoned that
the provisions of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 11551 were applicable; the city's regulatory
power was thus restricted to requiring "streets and drainage ways properly located and of
adequate width." See note 88 supra. On this point, the majority held that acceptance of
similar requirements by other subdividers in the area constituted a "practical adoption of a
master plan and zoning requirements therefor." Ayres v. City Council, supra at 42, 207 P.2d
at 7. Professor Haar says that the majority view ignores the purpose of the statute requiring
a master plan; "the plan then is not a goal but a mirror of what has been done in the
past." Haar, "The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution," 20 Law & Contemp. Prob.
353, 369 (1955).
95 Ayres v. City Council, supra note 94, at 48-49, 207 P.2d at 11-12 (dissenting opinion).
96 It has already been noted (note 94 supra) that the dissenters construed the enabling act
as authorizing exactions for streets within the subdivision. But it does not follow that, even
though authorized, the requirement for dedication of the additional twenty feet complied
with the reasonableness requirement of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 11525 (West 1964). See
note 82 supra.
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to support the flat proposition that subdivision control requirements for
street widening are valid conditions to plat approval.17 Such citations fail
to consider the limited facts of Ayres: the regulations had actually bene-
fited the subdivider by reducing his costs. 8
Another leading case, Brous v. Smith, 9 confirms the proposition that
subdivision control authority is not based solely on the grant of the
"privilege" of plat approval, but is attributable to police-power considera-
tions attendant upon the act of development itself. In Brous the developer
held six lots which had been platted in 1872, some sixty years prior to the
enactment of New York's subdivision control enabling act."0 His applica-
tion for a building permit to erect residences on these lots was denied be-
cause there was no improved road providing access as required by
statute.'3 He brought a mandamus action against the building inspector,
contending that the statute was invalid as a taking of his property without
compensation. Although the plaintiff acknowledged, and the court
agreed,'"2 that improved streets are a public necessity, he argued that they
could validly be acquired only by exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Judge Fuld, speaking for the court, answered this argument as follows:
Of course, no one may question that the town, were it desirous of construct-
ing a road across petitioner's property, would have to condemn the neces-
sary land and compensate petitioner. But the town here has no such desire
or design and does not seek to condemn land owned by petitioner. It is
petitioner who wishes to construct dwellings on his property, and the town
merely conditions its approval of such construction upon his compliance
with reasonable conditions designed for the protection both of the ultimate
purchasers of the homes and of the public. That the state may empower the
town to do this, is clear' 0 3
In support of this conclusion, the opinion cited several New York decisions
97 E.g., Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (11960);
Krieger v. Planning Comm'n, 224 Md. 320, 167 A.2d 885 (1961); Billings Properties, Inc. v.
Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964); Alperin v. Township of Middle-
town, 91 N.J. Super. 190, 219 A.2d 628 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1966); City of Albuquerque v.
Chapman, 77 N.M. 86, 419 P.2d 460 (1966); Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. '164, 106 N.E.2d
503 (1952).
98 At least two decisions have announced a more restricted-but, unfortunately erroneous
-interpretation of Ayres: that subdividers may constitutionally be required to provide only
those improvements made necessary by activity within the subdivision. See text accompanying
notes 169-77 infra, discussing Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, supra note 97, and Pioneer
Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
99 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503 (1952).
00 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1932, ch. 634.
101 N.Y. Town Law § 280-a(2) (McKinney 1965).
102 [lln this era of the automobile, modern living as we know it is impossible without
improved highways linking people with their jobs, their sources of food and other
necessities, their children's schools and their amusements and entertainments. Unimproved
or defective roads can cause a complete breakdown of services in a community. The state
has a legitimate and real interest in requiring that the means of access to the new con-
struction be properly improved and sufficient for the purpose.
Brous v. Smith, supra note 99, at 170, 106 N.E.2d at 506.
103 Id. at 170o-71, 106 N.E.2d at 506-07.
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upholding various types of zoning restrictions such as building setback
and minimum lot size.104
The plaintiff was not, of course, challenging the validity or wisdom of
these decisions. He contended that they were inapposite to his situation,
and that cases upholding the owner's right to compensation were con-
trolling.0 5 The opinion unfortunately does no more than announce a con-
clusion that compulsory improvement of streets is a proper exercise of the
police power. It does not indicate which factors influenced the decision.
In Brous, as in Ayres, the fundamental problem is one of frairness. 10 6 Con-
ceding that a rational nexus can be found between improved streets and
the public health, safety, and welfare, on what basis is the developer dis-
tinguishable from a non-developer who is entitled to compensation when
part of his land is converted to a public street?
It should be pointed out that analogies between subdivision control and
zoning must be drawn with great care, because the two are not cotermi-
nous. The fact that zoning requires no transfer of ownership or possession
would seem to suggest that its permissible limits are wider than the ambit
of subdivision control exactions. The latter requires the developer to
relinquish ownership of land or make a direct financial contribution for a
public activity in lieu of dedication. Recent decisions, however, indicate
that the subdivision control authority is actually broader than the zoning
power. For instance, zoning of land for parks and open spaces has been
held invalid,0 7 while compulsory dedication by subdividers for such uses
has been sustained in several recent cases. 08
It is worth noting that the statute under consideration in Brous provided
a "safety valve" which closely parallels the variance procedure typical
of zoning enabling acts.* This administrative procedure assures that
cases in which planning commission regulations impose great hardship on
developers can be adjusted without recourse to the judiciary. Such a
procedure has been said to render a statute "insulated from constitutional
104 E.g., Town of Islip v. Summers Coal & Lumber Co., 257 N.Y. 167, 177 N.E. 409 (1931)
(building setback); Dillard v. Village of North Hills, 276 App. Div. 969, 94 N.Y.S.2d 715
(2d Dep't 1950) (minimum lot size).
105 E.g., Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). The
principle that police-power regulation can be so severe as to amount to a taking has been
recently reaffirmed in Schour v. Village of Lynnbrook, 25 App. Div. 2d 677, 268 N.Y.S.2d 577
(2d Dep't 1966); Bismark v. Village of Bayville, 49 Misc. 2d 604, 267 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County '1966); Herkimer Pulp & Packaging- Corp. v. McMorran, 45 Misc. 2d 127,
256 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964), aff'd mem., 24 App. Div. 2d 929, 264
N.Y.S.2d 848 (3d Dep't 1965).
106 The question could also be expressed in terms of equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment, but the Supreme Court has not reviewed any subdivision control cases to date.
107 Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J.
539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); City of Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 NJ. Super. 136,
173 A.2d 785 (Super. Ct. L. 1961).
108 See notes 192-213 infra and accompanying text.
109 N.Y. Town Law § 280-9(3) (McKinney 1965).
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attack if the court insists upon the exhaustion [of administrative remedies]
doctrine.""'
B. Compulsory Installation of Paving and Utilities
The Standard City Planning Act authorizes planning commissions to
promulgate regulations:
[A]s to the extent to which streets and other ways shall be graded and im-
proved and to which water and sewer and other utility mains, piping, or
other facilities, shall be installed as a condition precedent to the approval
of the plat.'
Similar provisions are found in virtually every existing enabling act.1 2
They were enacted in response to the sad experiences with land develop-
ment which culminated in the boom of the late 1920's and early 1930's.113
For the most part, subdividers tended to be land speculators rather than
homebuilders."4 Their profits were realized from the sale of lots created
by subdividing larger tracts. Subdividers obviously had little to gain by
providing paved streets and utilities, and there was no significant demand
for improvements by the purchasers of the lots, who often were victims of
high-pressure sales tactics.", Orderly development of these lots, however,
could not be accomplished without providing paved streets and necessary
utilities such as sewer and water. The owner who installed these latter
improvements incident to construction of a dwelling on his lot risked the
loss of his investment in wells and septic tanks by subsequent annexation
to a town or city whose public health regulations required connection to
central water and sewer systems. The Standard Planning Act and similar
enactments signified recognition that paved streets and utilities are as
essential to efficient subdivision planning and control as adequate street
widths.
110 Similar provisions of New York's official map statute, N.Y. Gen. City Law § 35
(McKinney 1951), were so described in Mandelker, "Planning the Freeway: Interim Con-
trols in Highway Programs," 1964 Duke L.J. 439, 462. For application of a similar rationale
in a zoning case, see Michael v. Guilford County, 153 S.E.2d 106 (N.C. 1967).
"'1 Standard Planning Act § 14.
112 For examples see Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1205, 1210 n.30 (1961).
113 The boom produced thousands of "paper" subdivisions. A New Jersey survey in 1933
revealed that "unoccupied or sparsely occupied platted lands in New Jersey total nearly
185,000 acres, an acreage sufficient to supply over a million 50 X 120 foot lots . . .. The
number of vacant lots is sufficient to accommodate an additional population of 4,000,000-
equivalent to the entire present population of the State." New Jersey State Planning Board,
Land Subdivision in New Jersey 9 (1938).
114 The thesis that this term should be regarded as descriptive, rather than pejorative, is
ably defended in Elias & Gillies, "Some Observations on the Role of Speculators and Specula-
tion in Land Development," 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 789 (1965). With respect to speculative
practices during the booming twenties, see Cornick, Problems Created by Premature Sub-
division, ch. 1 (1938); Monchow, Real Estate Subdividing, ch. 1 (1939).
115 See, e.g., excerpts from Johnston, The Legendary Mizners (1953), quoted in Haar,
Land-Use Planning 348-49 n.3 (1959). For a fictionalized account of the effect of the land
boom on the residents of one small town, see Wolfe, You Can't Go Home Again 109-20,
142-46 (1940).
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Any municipality which adopts an implementing subdivision control
ordinance confers upon its planning commission the power to require the
subdivider to provide paving and utilities as a condition precedent to plat
approval. The Standard Planning Act provides that final approval of any
subdivision plat shall not be granted until the subdivider has either pro-
vided the required improvements or furnished a performance bond in
an amount sufficient to "secure to the municipality the actual construc-
tion and installation of such improvements or utilities at a time and ac-
cording to specifications fixed by or in accordance with the regulations of
the commission."""
The furnishing of paving and utilities constitutes a major expense item
for developers. Accordingly, it might have been anticipated that the con-
stitutionality of this type of exaction would be hotly contested by sub-
dividers and closely scrutinized by the judiciary. The actual experience
has been quite the contrary. In very few reported cases has the validity
of paving and utilities exactions been questioned, and, in general, the issue
has been resolved in favor of the muncipality.
One of the leading cases, Allen v. Stockwell,"'t was decided prior to the
advent of comprehensive subdivision planning. The City of Pontiac,
Michigan, had adopted a subdivision control ordinance, pursuant to the
"necessary and expedient" clause of its home rule charter, s"8 which re-
quired grading and graveling of streets and provision for surface drains,
cement sidewalks, and sanitary sewers. A subdivider had to furnish a
performance bond or actually complete the improvements according to
city specifications before his plat would be approved. The state statute
provided that no plat could be admitted to public record prior to approval
by the city commission.1 9
A subdivider who had refused to provide these utilities brought an
action of mandamus against the city commission of Pontiac to compel
approval of his proposed plat. In affirming the trial court's denial of the
writ, the Supreme Court of Michigan stated:
The Commission of the city has ample authority to make and enact the
platting ordinance herein set forth. A careful examination of the ordinance
in question satisfied us that it is a reasonable regulation, a reasonable
exercise of municipal and police power under the charter and statute, and
that the same should be sustained and complied with."o
116 Standard Planning Act § 14.
127 210 Mich. 488, 178 N.W. 27 (1920).
318 The local governing body was authorized, by ch. VII, § 21 of the charter, to exercise
"all municipal powers necessary, or which may be deemed expedient, for the complete and
efficient management and control of the municipal property and the administration of the
municipal government... 2' Id. at 490, 178 N.W. at 28.
319 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 5.3003 (1958).
120 Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mch. 488, 495, 178 N.W. 27, 29-30 (1920).
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The court cited no authority and offered no amplification of its reasoning
with respect to the "reasonableness" of the requirements or the source of
the city's authority to enforce them.
Another leading case, Petterson v. City of Napervflle,'2 ' brought into
issue the extra-territorial application of subdivision control authority. The
Illinois subdivision control enabling act required subdividers of land
located within one and one-half miles2  of any municipality which had
adopted an "official plan"" to obtain approval of the municipality's
governing body before recording a subdivision plat.", The subdividers'
land was located within the stated distance of the City of Naperville, which
had adopted a city plan. Although a plat of their proposed subdivision
was approved by the county planning authority, the Naperville planning
commission rejected it because of their failure to provide curbs, gutters,
and storm sewers. They then brought an action seeking both a declaratory
jugment that the city's requirements were void and an injunction against
enforcement of the subdivision control ordinance.
Evidence adduced at the hearing disclosed that the county authorities
had approved open-ditch roadside drainage with culverts, which could
be installed at a cost of $880. The cost of compliance with the city's
requirements, on the other hand, was estimated to be $19,810."5 Other
testimony tended to show that drainage from the subdivision would flow
away from the city, that streets outside the city were not maintained by
it, that surface water drainage has a direct relationship to public health,
and that road maintenance costs where curbs and gutters had been
provided were negligible as compared to roads served by open ditches.
The special master held for the plaintiffs, concluding that the city's ex-
actions were reasonable but that the ordinance constituted an invalid
delegation of legislative power to the planning commission. 26 The trial
court affirmed, but on the ground that the ordinance was unreasonable.
121 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
122 Subdivision control jurisdiction over an area extending five miles beyond the munid-
pality's corporate limits is granted by Standard Planning Act § 12. Existing enabling acts
grant extraterritorial jurisdiction ranging from one mile to six miles beyond the municipal
boundaries. See Appendix to Note, "An Analysis of Subdivision Control Legislation," 28 Ind.
L.J. 544, 574-86 (1953); Note, "Platting, Planning and Protection-A Summary of Sub-
division Statutes," 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1205, 1207 n.16 (1961).
123 "This plan may include reasonable requirements with refrence to streets, alleys, and
public grounds in unsubdivided lands . . ." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 24, § 53-2(2) (1953). By
contrast, the current enabling act lists numerous improvements for which "reasonable require-
ments" may be established. See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 24, § 11-12-5 (Smith-Hurd 1962). Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 24, § 11-12-6 (Smith-Hurd 1962), now designates the plan as an "official compre-
hensive plan."
124 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 109, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
125 This evidence was adduced through the testimony of the chief engineer of the county
highway department, who had prepared the plat. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 111. 2d 233,
239-40, 137 N.E.2d 371, 375 (1956). The practice of private developers employing public of-
ficials in this manner should be prohibited, or at least discouraged, in view of the obvious
conflict of interests.
126 The subdividers argued that the planning commission's power to grant variances from
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that, because the enabling
act conferred extra-territorial jurisdiction upon cities and villages, any
ordinance adopted pursuant to it would preempt the field to the exclusion
of county regulations. It then rejected the subdividers' argument that the
city was not authorized to require installation of street improvements. Al-
though the enabling act did not mention curbs and gutters, it did authorize
city planning commissions to enforce "reasonable requirements for public
streets.... " The plaintiffs argued that the scope of this grant was
limited to control of street width and alignment. The court refused to
interpret the act so narrowly, because:
The legislature undoubtedly had in mind the complex problem connected
with the development of territory contiguous to cities as bearing on the
health and safety of all inhabitants within and without the municipality;
that in such territory, in the interest of uniformity, the streets should be
constructed in such a way as to afford reasonably safe passage to the travel-
ling public and provide reasonable drainage in the interest of health.1 8
The enabling act was thus interpreted as granting the city power to
require adequate drainage in accordance with uniform standards.
The court then considered the reasonableness of applying the city's
regulations to the subdividers. The subdividers' argument, based primarily
upon the cost differential between the city and county requirements, did
not persuade the court. The opinion noted (1) the relationship between
the contested exactions and public health, (2) the fact that plaintiffs' land
was not treated differently from other land located "within the area in
question,"'2 (3) the subjection of landowners to "a legitimate exercise
of the police power,"'130 and (4) the strong presumption of validity to
which municipal ordinances are entited. The subdividers attempted to
buttress their argument concerning the unreasonableness of the exactions
by contending that they were unconstitutional, either as nonuniform taxa-
tion or as a taking of property for public use without just compensation.
The court, noting that the case was not an eminent domain proceeding
but a suit to compel approval of a plat, 3 ' concluded:
The validity of the ordinance is to be tested, neither by the principle of
uniformity of taxation nor by the law of eminent domain, but rather by
the settled rules of law applicable to cases involving the exercise of police
powers.... The imposition of reasonable regulations as a condition prece-
dent to the subdivision of lands and the recording of plats thereof is not a
the regulations imposed in the ordinance was unaccompanied by adequate standards or guide-
lines. The supreme court rejected this argument, holding that the commission's decision in
variance cases was merely advisory, the fnal decision being rendered by the local legislative
body. Id. at 248, 137 N.E.2d at 380.
127 See note 123, supra.
128 Petterson v. City of Naperville, supra note 125, at 245-46, 137 N.E.2d at 378.
129 Id. at 246, 137 N.E.2d at 379.
130 Id. at 247, 137 N.E.2d at 379.
131 Id. at 249, 137 N.E.2d at 380.
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violation of the constitutional requirement of uniformity of taxation or tant-
amount to the taking of private property for public use without just com-
pensation.13
2
This compendium of question-begging statements is, of course, reminis-
cent of Ayres (which the opinion does not cite). The court's reasoning
is that, since the action is for plat recordation, it does not involve the tax-
ing power or eminent domain. Because the plaintiffs seek the "privilege"'183
of plat recordation, they must comply with "reasonable" police-power
regulations. Finally, the requirements in question, though costly, are
reasonable because they are "non-discriminatory" and because the plain-
tiffs did not prove them unreasonable by "clear and affirmative evi-
dence.21
34
The testimony in Petterson tended to show that the exactions imposed
would be very costly to the subdivider. Does this distinguish the case from
Ayres, where the required dedications actually resulted in a saving to the
subdivider? Not necessarily. It is possible that much, if not all, of the
additional cost could be passed on to purchasers of subdivision lots in the
form of higher selling prices for "improved lots." The effect of these
exactions on the subdivider's profit potential apparently was not presented
to the court in Petterson. Perhaps this constituted a major deficiency in
the plaintiffs' case. If so, developers are on notice that, in order to establish
the burden imposed upon them by compulsory provision of improvements,
they must relate the cost of these improvements to the profitability of the
subdivision enterprise."3 5 Otherwise, doubts about the extent of the net
financial burden may be resolved against them by courts adhering to the
presumption that legislative enactments are valid.
Despite the unsatisfactory opinion, the result reached in Petterson is
probably sound. It can be argued that the procedure employed by the
planning commission in such cases is merely a method of accomplishing
indirectly the same result the city could achieve directly by installing the
improvement and imposing a special assessment lien against land benefited.
Although the power to levy special assessments has been sustained as an
132 Id at 249-50, 137 N.E.2d at 380.
133 lI. Rev. Stat. ch. 24, § 53-3 (1953), provided that no plat "shall be entitled to record
or shall be valid unless the subdivision shown thereon provides for streets, alleys, and public
grounds in conformity with the applicable requirements of the official plan." Ill. Rev. Stat.
ch. 109, § 2 (1953), required submission of proposed plats to governing bodies of towns hav-
ing an official plan for their approval. The penalty for selling subdivided land without full
compliance with these requirements was $25 per lot. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 109, § 5 (1953).
134 Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 246, 137 N.E.2d 371, 379 (1956).
135 Hopefully, anticipated profits can be estimated with reasonable accuracy in cases
where development and marketing of the subdivision is not yet complete. After all lots have
been sold, however, precise figures should be available. Such was the case in Jordan v. Village
of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965). See text accompanying notes
210-11 infra.
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exercise of the taxing power, it is not a property tax subject to the require-
ment of uniformity.136 The power has also been sustained as an exercise of
the police power, or on the basis of contract theories. It is not considered
an exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Whatever legal theory is used to sustain the power to levy such assess-
ments, the reasoning generally employed is most closely analagous to
quasi-contract: where a special benefit is conferred upon adjoining land
by the construction of public improvements such as paving, sewers, or
parks, it is fair to exact from the owner his pro rata share of their cost.' 37
This doctrine is sound where an actual benefit can be shown and
the assessment is no greater than the benefit conferred. It has been ably
demonstrated, however, that the judiciary has avoided the determination
of whether actual benefits have been conferred by invoking the doctrine
of deference to legislative judgments. 3 ' The result is said to have been
"the practical demise of the property benefit requirement."' 39 Neverthe-
less, the special-benefit analogy lends powerful support to compulsory
provision of improvements by subdividers.
The analogy becomes tenuous, however, when the subdivider is required
to install improvements outside his subdivision which will inure to the
benefit of others. Suppose, for instance, that his subdivision will necessitate
extension of a four-inch water main to his boundary. Must he bear the
entire cost of extension, or should part of the cost be assessed against
abutting landowners who will be permitted to make use of the main at a
later date if they choose? Or suppose that the municipality determines
that future development of neighboring tracts will result in such increased
demand for water as to require an eight-inch main. Can the municipality
compel the first subdivider to install an eight-inch main as a condition of
plat approval? In both cases, installation of the main will confer a benefit
to the subdivider; but it seems unfair to force one owner to provide im-
provements which will be available for other landowners and are con-
structed to meet their estimated future requirements.
The special assessment was suggested as a helpful analogy in upholding
compulsory installation of subdivision improvements, and not as a concept
establishing the constitutional limits of the police power in subdivision
control matters. Perhaps Ayres furnishes a better analogy. There the sub-
divider was compelled to dedicate land in conformity with a master plan
which established street widths as a function of estimated traffic volume,
136 14 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 38.01 (3d ed. 1950).
137 Id. '§ 38.02.
138 Heyman & Gilhool, "The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs
on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions," 73 Yale L.J. 1119, '1147-52(1964).
139 Id. at 1147.
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without reference to any particular lot, tract, or subdivision. In fact, the
city had contemplated widening one of the boulevards abutting the sub-
divided land long before the owner submitted a proposed plat for ap-
proval. 40 But the existence of the master plan plus the fact that a new
subdivision would generate some additional traffic were, according to the
court, sufficient bases to justify compulsory dedication as an exercise of
the police power. Now, suppose a municipality has established that eight-
inch water mains are required to service the demand (actual and potential)
from a particular area, and that the immediate development of a sub-
division within the area will contribute to that need. It seems consistent
with Ayres to require the subdivider to furnish eight-inch mains, even
though they will benefit other potential users. The cases might be dis-
tinguished if the developer could show that installation of the mains would
result in financial detriment. Nevertheless, in neither case would the im-
provement fill a need attributable solely to the subdivider's activity, and
in both cases one may argue that the benefit would inure primarily to the
public rather than the subdivider.
It has been held that a subdivider may properly be required to furnish
mains outside his boundary to supply additional water required by his
subdivision. 4' In a leading New Jersey case,14 the corporate owner of
thirty lots, which were scattered within a subdivision containing more
than 300 lots, proposed to combine its holdings into fifteen building sites
and to construct a dwelling on each one. The subdivision plat had been
recorded prior to adoption of the state enabling act and the local imple-
menting ordinance. Nevertheless, the act of combining and improving
these lots, unaccompanied by submission of a new plat for recordation,
might have been sufficient to subject the developer to the local planning
requirements for subdividers, 143 including extension of water mains to the
lots.. These requirements were held unreasonable as applied to this
particular developer, however, because:
'40 The trial court found that the widening of Sepulveda Boulevard and establishment
of the planting strip "had been in contemplation of the authorities whether or not the peti-
tioner intended to subdivide." Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 38, 207 P.2d 1, 5 (1949).
141 Rounds v. Board of Water & Sewer Comm'rs 347 Mass. 40, '196 N.E.2d 209 (1964).
142 Lake Intervale Homes, Inc. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 147
A.2d 28 (1958).
143 It is firmly settled in this state that lot lines as delineated on a map fled under the
Old Map Act must give way to a subsequent exercise of the zoning power increasing area
requirements.... Subdivision control, like zoning, is an implementing tool of planning.
We can perceive no reason for concluding that filing of a map under the Old Map Act
does not prevent application of the one power but it does the other. Both are necessary
to abolish the social disease of blight, the essential difference between them being the
difference between inoculation and surgery.
Id. at 437-38, 147 A.2d at 37.
144 Only six years prior to the decision in the Lake Intervale Homes case, the same court
had held that municipalities had no power to withhold water entirely, but could nevertheless
exercise a "governmental discretion as to the extension of the water mains, governed largely
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It is undisputed that other property owners contiguous to plaintiff's prop-
erty and abutting on the extensions made in the instant case will ultimately
benefit therefrom. Moreover, plaintiff is a relatively small scale developer
and some of the building lots were scattered in isolated pairs throughout
the tracts, so that at times an extension along an entire street was necessary
in order to service one house in the block.145
Although this seems consistent with the special-benefit analysis, the court
chose to rest the decision on the much narrower ground that the munici-
pality had formulated no standards for the installation of improvements
by subdividers. The opinion pointedly refers without hostility to a regula-
tion of the New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which
provided that: "A developer who is ordered to make a deposit to cover
the original cost [of water mains] may recoup the entire sum over a
prescribed period of time if the revenue produced from the new consumers
meets certain requirements."
146
The case reveals a judicial indisposition to confine to exactions satisfy-
ing the special-benefit rule a municipality's control over provision of utili-
ties outside the subdivision. This attitude, in turn, underscores the emer-
gent recognition that the source of subdivision control regulations is the
police power. The exercise of this power is not and has never been de-
pendent upon the conferring of individual benefits. Its justification lies in
protection of the public health, safety, morals, and welfare, even though a
detriment is suffered by individual property owners.
C. Compulsory Dedication for Educational and Recreational Uses
In addition to authorizing compulsory dedication of land for streets
and mandatory installation of subdivision utilities as conditions of plat
approval,' 47 the Standard City Planning Act authorizes planning com-
missions to "provide for . . . adequate and convenient open spaces for
by the extent of the need and economic considerations.... ." The providing of water, however,
could not be conditioned upon "wholly alien consideration related to planning and zoning."
Reid Dev. Corp. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 10 N.J. 229, 235, 89 A.2d 667, 670
(1952). But this later statement must be considered in context. The actual holding was
predicated upon findings that (1) there was no statutory authority for the municipality's
requirement of replatting to form 100-foot frontage lots as a condition of extension of water
mains; and (2) the requirement was not one usually imposed upon other subdividers who
requested similar extensions.
Compare Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Board of Princeton Township, 92 N.J.
Super. 402, 223 A.2d 640 (1966), in which a regulation requiring a subdivider to pave a
road beyond his boundary was held invalid because unauthorized.
145 Lake Intervale Homes, Inc. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, supra note '142, at
441, 107 A.2d at 39.
146 Id. at 442-43, 107 A.2d at 39-40.
147 Standard Planning Act 1 14 expressly authorizes utility exactions (notes 111i, 116
supra) ; as to streets, it authorizes only regulations providing for "proper arrangement." An
explanatory note indicates that this grant of power is made "to insure that streets or rights
of way, whether dedicated as public streets or not, shall fit into each other and the ultimate
street plan of the city.. . ." Id. § 27 n.70.
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. . . recreation, light and air, and for the avoidance of congestion of
population .... M48 Many state enabling acts contain similar terminology.
A few include more explicit authorization for subdivision control regula-
tions, requiring dedication of land for parks, playgrounds, school grounds,
and other public uses as a condition of plat approval. 49
The Standard Planning Act obligates commissions to "adopt a master
plan for the physical development of the municipality," including the lo-
cation and extent of playgrounds, parks, and "other public ways, grounds
and open spaces, the general location of public buildings and other public
property. ... "I" Subsequent to the adoption of the master plan, no
public building or grounds may be constructed or acquired without the
prior approval of the planning commission.
Two very different types of regulatory power are conferred upon muni-
cipalities by these provisions of the Standard Planning Act and similar
enabling acts. The delegation of power to control the character, extent,
and location of public buildings and grounds includes no authorization to
require dedication of private land for public purposes.' It merely per-
mits the municipality to adopt an orderly and systematic plan for the
expansion of its public facilities. Acquisition of land for these public uses
is accomplished primarily through exercise of the power of eminent
domain, with compensation being paid to private owners. On the other
hand, the power to require dedication of land for specified uses is avail-
able only in the event of subdivision or development of land by private
owners. The amount of land to be dedicated for these purposes, not speci-
fied in the Act, is established by local planning commissions, and em-
bodied in standards applicable to all developers.
The distinction may be illustrated by the following example. Suppose
a planning commission has adopted a master plan which designates a cer-
tain area as the site for a three-acre public park. Suppose further that the
commission has promulgated regulations requiring subdividers to dedicate
ten percent of the area of their subdivisions for park and playground
purposes as a condition of plat approval. Finally, suppose that the three-
acre park is located entirely within a fifteen-acre tract which the owner
desires to subdivide. He can be required to dedicate one and one-half
acres for park purposes, but the additional one and one-half acres of land
must be acquired from him by a negotiated sale or eminent domain pro-
148 Id. § 14.
149 E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 19-2829 (1947); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 53-747 (1964); Mont. Rev.
Codes Ann. § 11-602(9) (1957); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36:21 (1955); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 58.16.110 (1961). But see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 41, § 81Q (1966), set forth in
note 30 supra.
150 Standard Planning Act § 6.
151 Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 268 P.2d 51 (1962).
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ceedings. If the owner were not seeking subdivision or development ap-
proval, he would be entitled to compensation for the entire three acres
before the municipality could convert it into a park.
Only one substantial constitutional problem has arisen with respect to
reservation of land for public uses via the master plan. Some enabling
acts provide that, after the designation of a public use on the official map,
no private development of the site shall take place for a specified period.'52
Land thus "reserved" is of limited utility until the municipality deter-
mines whether or not to acquire it for the designated purpose. The tech-
nique is similar to official mapping for streets, except that in the latter
case the reservation is for an unlimited period. Street mapping has been
upheld against the contention that it constitutes a taking of property for
public use without compensation. 153
One decision held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute which au-
thorized official mapping for parks and playgrounds and imposed a three-
year moratorium on construction of improvements.'54 The opinion pur-
ported to distinguish the street-mapping cases on the ground that streets
are "narrow, well defined and necessary," whereas recreational areas "may
be very large and very desirable but [are] not necessary." 55 The court
concluded that the statute constituted "a taking of property by possibility,
contingency, blockade, and subterfuge ... ."15' This opinion represents the
152 E.g., NJ. Stat. Ann. 1 40:55-1.20 (Supp. 1965): "The governing body or the planning
board shall be permitted to reserve the location and extent of school sites, public parks and
playgrounds shown on the master plan . . . for a period of one year. ... Cf. NJ. Stat.
Ann. § 40:55-1.32 (Supp. 1965):
Upon the application for approval of a plat, the municipality may reserve for future public
use the location and extent of public parks and playgrounds shown on the official map
... and within the area of said plat for a period of one year after the approval of the
final plat or within such further time as agreed to by the applying party.
It is not clear why the latteesection omits mention of school sites.
During the one-year reservation period, the owner may use the land for any purpose
other than location of buildings. No building permit may be issued for construction of
buildings during the period unless the board of adjustment finds that the parcel subject to
reservation cannot otherwise "yield a reasonable return to the owner." N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:55-138 (Supp. 1965).
153 Headiey v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198, (1936). Cf. Standard Plan-
ning Act § 22 which requires compensation for land subject to reservation for future acquisi-
tion.
154 Miller v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951). But cf. Segarra v. Iglesias,
71 P.R.R. 139 (1950), in which a thirteen-month reservation period was held to be not
unreasonable.
155 Miller v. Beaver Falls, supra note 154, at 193, 82 A.2d at 36. The court was,
perhaps, aware of the flimsiness of this distinction. A later passage in the opinion indicates
that the validity of street mapping is too firmly established in the jurisdiction to be changed.
The court was, however, unwilling to extend the doctrine to parks and playgrounds. "A
principle of questionable constitutionality should not be extended beyond its present applica-
tion or limitation especially if such extension would violate either the letter or the spirit of the
Constitution." Id. at 196, 82 A.2d at 37-38.
156 Id. at 194, 82 A.2d at 37. Compare District of Columbia v. Armes, 8 App. D.C. 393
(1896), where it was held that official mapping for eventual condemnation is not unconstitu-
tional solely because payment of compensation is deferred until the streets are actually
opened.
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nadir of deference to legislative judgment on the question of public need.
Nevertheless, so long as the period of reservation is not unreasonably
long and the owner is not denied all beneficial use of his property,157 this
type of statute could be upheld by analogy to street-mapping or interim-
zoning ordinances.' 58
In sharp contrast to reservation of land for possible acquisition for
public use, attempts to impose compulsory dedication for park and educa-
tional uses have aroused familiar controversies over authorization, dele-
gation, and administration. The development of case law on this subject
deserves systematic review. In what was apparently the earliest case,
In re Lake Secor Dev. Co.,'59 the owner of 138 acres of land submitted a
plat showing some 2,000 lots, each twenty feet in width and one hundred
feet deep. Approval was denied on the ground, inter alia, that no area
had been reserved for recreational purposes. The enabling act empowered
the planning commission to require proposed plats "in proper cases [to]
show a park or parks suitably located for playground or other recrea-
tional purposes."' 160 The New York appellate division affirmed without
opinion the trial court's judgment that the planning commission's dis-
approval was authorized, reasonable, and therefore valid.' 6,'
In Zayas v. Puerto Rico Planning, Urbanizing & Zoning Bd., 162 the
enabling act authorized the planning board to adopt regulations control-
ling plat approval, including provision "for obligatory reservations of the
157 Safety-valve provisions could include assurance of full utilization of the land for
any purpose other than buildings, plus the familiar variance remedy administered by boards
of adjustment, utilizing either the zoning ("unnecessary hardship") standard or the more
liberal street-mapping ("reasonable return") standard. Both are provided for in the New
Jersey enabling act. See note ,152 supra.
158 Interim zoning ordinances are enacted to preserve the status quo pending the com-
pletion of a comprehensive land-use plan. The need for "freezing" existing uses has been
stated as follows:
It is common knowledge that the preparation of a proper comprehensive zoning ordi-
nance often requires much study and time. The very pendency of the adoption of a
comprehensive extraterritorial zoning ordinance might precipitate action on the part of
property owners in the territory to be affected which would tend to frustrate the ob-
jective sought to be attained by the prospective ordinance.
Walworth County v. City of Elkhorn, 27 Wis. 2d 30, 38-39, 133 N.W.2d 257, 262 (1965).
Similar considerations seem to support the municipality's interest in preserving existing open
space which has been earmarked for recreational uses against development during the period
required for reaching a decision whether or not to acquire it.
Specific enabling authority is probably necessary, and the time period should not be un-
duly long. For discussion of these factors in interim zoning, see 1 Yokley, Zoning Law and
Practice § 77-82 (Supp. 1964).
159 141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1931), aff'd, 235 App.
Div. 627, 255 N.Y. Supp. 853 (2d Dep't 1932).
160 N.Y. Town Law § 1149(n) (Cahill's Consol. 1930). This provision contained the
further requirement that parks should be "of reasonable size for neighborhood playgrounds
or other recreation uses," but no standards were prescribed.
161 The supreme court opinion merely announces this conclusion; there is no discussion
or citation of authority. In re Lake Secor Dev. Co., supra note 159, at 915, 252 N.Y. Supp.
at 812.
162 69 P.R.R. 27 (1948).
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minimum area to be used for schools, parks, ... and other public pur-
poses ... .,163 Pursuant to this authorization, the board promulgated a
regulation requiring a minimum of five percent of the total area of pro-
posed subdivisions to be reserved and dedicated for recreational purposes.
The developer contended that this requirement was an unconstitutional
taking of his property. The board replied that, as a condition of plat ap-
proval, it could properly require him to transfer the requisite amount of
land for recreational purposes. The court upheld the requirement of dedi-
cation for park purposes on the ground that it "is a necessary measure and
primarily for the public health and safety .... ,6 1 But it carefully con-
strued the statute as not requiring an actual transfer of title to the land
so dedicated, in order to avoid "a serious constitutional question... which
would involve the alleged taking of private property without due compen-
sation."'" 5 As a result, the subdivider retained ownership of the land, but
was compelled to make a permanent reservation of the required amount
for recreational purposes. The park was not limited to use by the subdivi-
sion residents, but was made available to the general public." 0
The conclusion that there could be no taking so long as the developer
retained title seems erroneous. It is well settled that any governmental
interference with use and enjoyment of land which is severe enough to
result in an ouster of the owner from possession constitutes a compensible
taking.0 7 If the regulation is severe enough to constitute a taking, then
either (1) it is void because no compensation is provided, and the owner
retains title free of the regulation, or (2) the owner has an action for in-
verse condemnation to require payment and effectuate an actual transfer
of title. 10 8 Conversely, if compulsory dedication of land for public uses
is a valid exercise of the police power, then the state of the title after im-
position of the requirement is of little consequence.
In Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,19 the
Illinois enabling act authorized municipal planning commissions to "estab-
lish reasonable standards of design" for redevelopment and subdivision
lands, and to exact "reasonable requirements for ... parks, playgrounds,
163 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 23, § 10 (1964) (now P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 23, 1 10 (Supp. 1965)).
164 Zayas v. Puerto Rico Planning, Urbanizing, & Zoning Bd., 69 P.R.R. 27, 34 (1948).
165 Ibid.
166 We are aware of the practical problem that the Government may not be authorized
to spend public funds for the establishment of parks on land to which it has no title. But
this does not constitute justification for us to redraft the statute and the regulations so
as to require a transfer of title. The statute and the regulations in their present form only
require that the owner reserve, not that he transfer to the Government, the park area.
Id. at 36.
167 11 McQuilin, Municipal Corporations § 32.26 (3d ed. rev. 1964).
108 See note 91 supra.
169 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
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school grounds, and other public grounds. ' 170 The official plan adopted by
Mount Prospect pursuant to this statute contained a requirement that
each developer dedicate one acre for each sixty new residential building
sites and one-tenth acre for each business or industrial building site, to
be used for "public grounds, other than streets, alleys and parking
areas .... ,,171
A subdivider of land in the village submitted a proposed plat showing
250 residential units to its planning commission. Approval was refused
because of his unwillingness to dedicate 6.7 acres of land for an elementary
school and playground site. He brought an action for mandamus to compel
approval of the plat, contending that the ordinance was invalid. The
trial court granted the writ, and its action was affirmed by the Illinois
Supreme Court.
A prior decision of that court, Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove,171
had held that the enabling act did not authorize municipalities to exact
cash payments from subdividers in lieu of dedication of land for educa-
tional purposes. Since compulsory dedication of land for school and park
grounds was specifically authorized, the Rosen case was not controlling.
But the question of the reasonableness of the Mount Prospect require-
ments remained. In deciding this issue, the court elevated the following
passage from its Rosen opinion to a statement of the controlling constitu-
tional standard of reasonableness:
"[T] he developer of a subdivision may be required to assume those costs
which are specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity and which
would otherwise be cast upon the public." ... "The distinction between per-
missible and forbidden requirements is suggested in Ayres v. City Council
... which indicates that the municipality may require the developer to
provide the streets which are required by the activity within the subdivi-
sion but can not require him to provide a major thoroughfare, the need for
which stems from the total activity of the community."' 73
This statement manifests a complete misunderstanding of Ayres, in which
the Supreme Court of California had refused to impose such a restrictive
test. The Illinois court apparently failed to appreciate the import of the
statements in Ayres that "it is no defense to the conditions imposed in a
subdivision map proceeding that their fulfillment will incidentally also
benefit the city as a whole," and that "population factors affecting the sub-
division and the neighborhood are appropriate for consideration" by plan-
170 I1l. Ann. Stat. ch. 24, § 11-12-5 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
171 Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 377-78, 176
N.E.2d 799, 800 (1961).
172 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
173 Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, supra note 171, at 379-80,
176 N.E.2d at 801-02.
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ning commissions in formulating subdivision control regulations. 74 In
fact, the court could hardly have chosen a case whose rationale is more
directly opposed to the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test than
Ayres.17 5 Having purported to follow Ayres, the Pioneer Trust decision
reached a contrary result without attempting to distinguish it. Further,
the court made no attempt to distinguish its own prior decision in Petter-
son v. City of Naperville,176 which had upheld compulsory installation of
curbs and gutters.
The "specifically and uniquely attributable" test was applied to the
record presented in Pioneer Trust as follows:
The agreed statement of facts shows that the present school facilities of
Mount Prospect are near capacity. This is the result of the total develop-
ment of the community. If this whole community had not developed to such
an extent or if the existing school facilities were greater, the purported need
supposedly would not be present. Therefore, on the record in this case the
school problem which allegedly exists here is one which the subdivider
should not be obliged to pay the total cost of remedying, and to so construe
the statute would amount to an exercise of the power of eminent domain
without compensation.277
The decision declares neither the enabling act nor the implementing ordi-
nance invalid per se. It purports only to declare the ordinance invalid as
applied to this particular subdivider under these particular circumstances.
But can one imagine a better set of facts to demonstrate that the need
for new school grounds is "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the
new subdivision? Pioneer Trust seems erroneous both in its adoption of
an unduly restrictive standard of reasonableness not justified by the sup-
porting authority, and in its misapplication of that test to one of the few
factual situations which ought to satisfy it.
During the late 1950's, significant events were taking place in New York
as well. For many years,, the Town Law had authorized local planning
boards to require the inclusion of park facilities as a condition for ap-
proval of subdivision plats.' Until 1959, however, there was no express
provision for exaction of cash in lieu of land dedication for recreational
purposes. In that year, an amendment to the enabling act was adopted
stating that:
If the planning board determines that a suitable park or parks of ade-
quate size cannot be properly located in any such plat or is otherwise not
practical, the board may require as a condition to approval of any such plat
174 See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
175 In fact, this test probably reflects more accurately the position of the Ayres dissenters.
See note 94 supra.
170 See text accompanying notes 121-35 supra.
177 Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 IIL. 2d 375, 381-82, 176
N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961).
178 See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
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a payment to the town of an amount to be determined by the town board,
which amount shall be available for use by the town for neighborhood park,
playground or recreation purposes including the acquisition of property.1 9
The validity of this amendment was immediately contested in Gulest
Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh. 8 ° Newburgh had adopted subdivi-
sion control regulations which required dedication of up to ten percent
of the gross area of each new subdivision for recreational purposes. The
planning board was authorized to determine the amount of land to be
dedicated, and empowered to waive dedication altogether in cases where
such a requirement would be "unreasonable or undesirable."' 81 In cases
where the requirement of dedication was waived, however, the subdivider
was required to "deposit" fifty dollars per lot into a "special fund for the
future acquisition and/or improvement of recreational facilities in the
Town."' 2 The plaintiff owned a twenty-five acre tract of land within the
town limits, which it proposed to subdivide into forty-six lots. The plan-
ning board approved its plat without provision of open space for recrea-
tional purposes, subject to the payment of $2,300 into the fund. The
plaintiff thereupon brought an action for a declaratory judgment that the
regulation was invalid. The supreme court granted summary judgment
in favor of the plaintiff and the appellate division affirmed.
Each tribunal confined its attention to the validity of the 1959 amend-
ment, deeming it unnecessary to determine the validity of the authoriza-
tion for compulsory land dedication. The amendment was held consti-
tutionally defective for several reasons: the fund was established for the
benefit of the whole town, and might be used for recreational programs
not directly related to the development of the subdivision;' 8 3 the author-
ization to use the fund for "recreational purposes" was too vague; and the
statute failed to set forth with sufficient precision and.clarity the standards
by which towns might exercise the authority. The supreme court justice
held the 1959 amendment unconstitutional on its face." The appellate
division affirmed, stating: "We agree with the determination of special
term that the statute in question is unconstitutional as applied to the facts
179 N.Y. Town Law § 277 (McKinney 1965). Interestingly, no parallel amendment was
made to the Village Law.
180 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1960), aff'd, 15 App.
Div. 2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't 1962).
181 Id. at 1005, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
182 Id. at 1005-06, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 731. [Emphasis added.]
183 This position is similar to the one taken in Pioneer Trust in mistaken reliance on
Ayres. No authority for it is cited in the opinion.
184 "rT]he court holds that so much of the provisions of section 277 of the Town Law as
amended by chapter 846 of the Laws of 1959 is wholly without force and effect, illegal, null
and void and unconstitutional." Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d
1004, 1008, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729, 734 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1960), aff'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 815,
225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't 1962).
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of this case."'8 5 Despite this "agreement," the appellate division looked
to the application rather than to the face of the statute. The court should
have stated the "facts of the case" on which its opinion was grounded. The
appellate division may have deemed the sum of fifty dollars per lot to be
excessive, or viewed the requirement of $2,300 as an unreasonable burden
on the subdivider. In the absence of clarification, however, any interpre-
tation of the ruling is mainly speculation. But commentators seem to agree
that the case stands for the proposition that no scheme for cash payments
in lieu of dedication is valid unless the funds must be expended in such
a way as to confer a direct benefit upon the new subdivision.'86
Pioneer Trust and Gulest seemed to confirm the emergence of highly
restrictive standards for the validity of exactions for recreational and edu-
cational purposes: the need for new facilities must be "specifically and
uniquely attributable" to the new subdivision, and the land or cash do-
nated by the subdivider must be used for the subdivision's direct benefit.
There is a superficial consistency between this standard and exactions
for streets, which usually are necessitated solely by the new subdivision
and confer upon new residents the-benefit of access to the existing street
system. The same is true with respect to utilities, which are necessitated
by the subdivision development and confer "special benefits" upon each
newly created lot. But, as we have seen, compulsory dedication for streets
has not been confined to that width and alignment necessary to accommo-
date traffic attributable solely to the new subdivision. 87 In addition, the
judiciary has shown little inclination to require proof that the enhance-
ment of lot value attributable to new utilities is equal to or greater than
the special assessment imposed.' In formulating a more restrictive con-
stitutional standard with respect to exactions for purposes other than
streets and utilities, these cases departed from traditional police-power
analysis. Commentators were driven to rather tenuous reasoning in the
attempt to harmonize this new rationale with conventional zoning and sub-
185 Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 15 App. Div. 2d 815, 816, 225 N.Y.S.2d
538 (2d Dep't 1962).
186 E.g., "The Gulest court would prohibit exactions unless they result in facilities which
directly benefit the subdivision to which they are related." Heyman & Gilhool, supra note
138, at 1136.
The Gulest rationale was soundly criticized as follows:
The distinction between forced dedication of land and forced payment of fees seems
unsupportable. If a developer can be compelled to dedicate land because future residents
of his subdivision will need parks, there is no reason why those parks cannot be located
outside the subdivision. The need generated by the subdivider's activity remains the
same; so long as it is that need which is satisfied, nothing should stand in the way of
improvements which incidentally will be more advantageous to the whole community.
Note, "Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1622, 1628 ('1962).
187 Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928), and
Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949), are the two leading cases. These
cases are discussed in text accompanying notes 61-66 supra and notes 80-93 supra.
.88 See text accompanying note 138 supra.
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division control doctrine. 89 More significantly, the development of new
techniques to satisfy the need for additional educational and recreational
facilities within the framework of the new strictures seemed to be a vir-
tually impossible task. 9° However, a dramatic reversal has recently oc-
189 While zoning involves no more than negative prohibitions on certain uses of the
owner's property, subdivision regulation often makes positive exactions of the owner.
. . . It is submitted that this difference necessitates a more specific test of constitutional-
ity, i.e., the legislation should not only be substantially related to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare, but, insofar as dedications, activities, and expenditures
are positively required of the subdivider, these requirements should be reasonably related
to the subdivision in question and should concern types of improvement for which
municipalities have generally been conceded the power to levy special taxes or assess-
ments.
Reps & Smith, "Control of Urban Land Subdivision," 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 405, 407 (,1963).
The defect in this reasoning is, of course, that "negative" zoning regulation can have a much
more serious economic impact on landowners and developers than subdivision control exac-
tions. "There seems no ground for distinguishing constitutionally a 'positive exaction' and a
negative regulation of use. Either, neither, or both can be discriminatory or a taking in any
specific case." Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 138, at 1137.
The Reps and Smith formulation provides an interesting contrast with Professor Dunham's
analysis, which appeared four years prior to Pioneer Trust and Gulest:
The public need not compensate an owner when it takes (restricts) his privileges of
ownership in order to prevent him from imposing a cost upon others; but when the state
takes (uses or restricts) his property rights in order to obtain a public benefit it must
compensate him....
It is unconstitutional to compel an owner to commit his land to park use in order to meet
the public desire for a park, but an owner may be compelled to furnish a portion of his
land for a park where the need for a park results primarily fom activity on other land
of the owner.
Dunham, "A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning," 58 Colum. L. Rev. 650, 666
(1958) .This rationale, rather than the majority opinion in Ayres, really underlies the "spe-
cifically and uniquely attributable" test of Pioneer Trust.
Even if constitutional distinctions between zoning and subdivision control authority are
considered illusory, the difficult problem of distinguishing "regulation" from "taking" remains.
The best-known theory is probably Ernst Freund's:
Under the police power, rights of property are impaired not because they become useful
or necessary to the public, or because some public advantage can be gained by disregard-
ing them, but because their free exercise is believed to be detrimental to public interest;
it may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain because it is useful to
the public, and under the police power because it is harmful....
Freund, The Police Power § 511 (1904). Freund recognized, however, that the distinction
was really one of degree. It is of little utility in subdivision control cases, since exactions
are usually imposed to prevent a condition deemed to be harmful; at the same time, they
may well confer a benefit upon the general public.
Zoning cases also present difficult questions with regard to the regulation-taking distinction.
Professor Sax has formulated a "governmental enterprise" theory to resolve such issue: if
regulation is imposed to acquire new governmental resources, it is a taking; if it is imposed
to mediate conflicts between competing private economic interests, it is a proper exercise of
the police power. See Sax, "Takings and the Police Power," 74 Yale L.J. 36, 67 (1964). How-
ever, in much of zoning, and virtually all of subdivision control, government is really acting
in a dual capacity. See Comment, "The Validity of Airport Zoning Ordinances," 1965 Duke
L.J. 792, 798-800.
190 The noblest attempt was that of Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 138. They proposed
a cost-accounting approach, to facilitate computation of the quantum of need for public
facilities attributable to new subdivisions. Id. at 1141-46. This clearly would satisfy the
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test of Pioneer Trust; but what of the direct benefit
requirement of Gulest? Heyman and Gilhool argue that Gulest is unsound and aberrational:
"the conventional zoning and subdivision cases hold that it is immaterial that a subdivision
exaction also would inure to the benefit of the public so long as there is a rational nexus
between the exaction and the costs generated by the creation of the subdivision." Id. at 1137.
However, the "conventional subdivision cases" do not support the Pioneer Trust "specifically
and uniquely attributable" standard. See text accompanying note 187 supra.
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curred. Within the past two years, three jurisdictions have refused to fol-
low Pioneer Trust and Gulest, including the New York Court of Appeals.
These decisions apparently signal a return to traditional analysis. 9'
In Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County,19 the Supreme
Court of Montana upheld a statute requiring dedication of land for park
and playground purposes,'193 rejecting a subdivider's contention that it
constituted a taking of his land for public use without compensation.
Apart from a rehashing of the voluntariness fiction,19 an aside about
the statute's legislative history,195 and a reference to its vintage,'96 the
opinion stands as an essay in judicial deference to legislative judgment.
The court acknowledged the elastic character of the police power. 9 and
the necessity for divorcing judgments about the wisdom of legislation
from the determination of its constitutionality.18 The deference theme
was brought to a rousing climax in the court's handling of Pioneer Trust,
upon which the subdivider relied heavily. The court appeared to accept
the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test without question, but then
announced that the test was satisfied with respect to the statute because
"the question of whether or not the subdivision created the need for a
park or parks is one that has been already answered by our Legislature."'"9
The Montana enabling act establishes standards for dedication of park
land, according to the size of the subdivision, and invests local planning
commissions with a measure of discretion to vary these standards in
individual cases.2"0 By contrast, the Illinois statute under review in
Pioneer Trust authorized municipal planning commissions to require dedi-
191 I.e., the decisions eschew illusory distinctions between subdivision control and other
police-power instruments, such as zoning, which are offered in justification of a stricter stan-
dard of constitutionality for subdivision control exactions.
192 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964).
'93 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 11-602(9) (1957) provides that each proposed plat "must
show that at least one-ninth of the platted area, exclusive of sreets, alleys, avenues, and high-
ways, is forever dedicated to the public for parks and playgrounds . . ." Each municipal
governing body was empowered to reduce the production to not less than one-twelfth, "for
good cause shown;" the requirement could be waived altogether, where the platted area
consists of less than twenty acres.
194 See notes 23-30 supra and accompanying text.
195 [The provision in question] ... was passed as an amendment to the original statute
in the Fifteenth Legislative Session in 1917. A check of the House and Senate journals for
that session reveals that it went through both houses with but one dissenting vote and
that significantly enough was by the Senator from Yellowstone County.
Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 29, 394 P.2d 182, 185 (1964).
196 "From that date [1917] until the present suit, there has never been a case even
remotely questioning its constitutionality, however, that has no bearing on the ultimate
question." Ibid.
197 "In gauging the reasonableness of the statute in question, we must not look back
solely to past precedents, but must also look ahead." Id. at 31, 294 P.2d at 186.
198 Included is a quotation, from an earlier case, to the effect that acts of the legislature
will not be invalidated unless unconstitutionality is "shown beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id. at 30, 394 P.2d at 185.
'99 Id. at 35, 394 P.2d at 188.
200 See note 193 supra.
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cation of land to meet "reasonable requirements for . . . parks, play-
grounds, school grounds, and other public grounds," without establishing
any guidelines.2 1 It is difficult to perceive any substantial distinction be-
tween the two statutes in terms of their objective or means of implementa-
tion. The sole material distinction is the fact that one establishes a general
framework of standards while the other delegates authority to local offi-
cials to establish "reasonable" standards. Each statute reflects legislative
judgments that most subdivisions create a need for parks and other pub-
lic grounds, that the extent of the need created varies according to the size
and location of the subdivision, and that the exact amount of land to be
dedicated by a particular subdivider should be determined ultimately by
local officials.
Billings Properties cannot be harmonized with Pioneer Trust by dis-
tinguishing the two statutes. The conflicts in the cases stem from
the antithetical views of the respective courts. By requiring a showing
that the disputed exaction is necessitated solely by the new subdivision,
the Illinois court registered its dissent from the legislative judgment that
every new subdivision creates a need for additional recreational and edu-
cational facilities. The Montana court deferred both to this judgment and
to the legislative determination of the quantum of new recreational facili-
ties necessitated by each new subdivision. The two cases are irreconcilable,
despite assurances to the contrary in the Billings Properties opinion. Just
as Pioneer Trust formulated an almost unattainable standard of validity
for this type of exaction, Billings Properties established a virtually unas-
sailable presumption in its favor. Neither position has been tested by sub-
sequent cases in those jurisdictions.
An intermediate rationale was adopted by the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin in the landmark case of Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls."2
The enabling act authorized municipalities and counties to condition plat
approval upon compliance with regulations adopted to accomplish the pur-
poses, inter alia, of facilitating "adequate provision for.., schools, parks,
playgrounds and other public requirements," in order to provide "the
best possible environment for human habitation .... . 2o3 Pursuant to this
authority, the Village of Menomonee Falls adopted a subdivision control
ordinance requiring dedication of "adequate land to provide for the school,
park and recreation needs of the subdivision," to the value of $200 for
201 See text accompanying note 170 supra.
202 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
203 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 236.45(1) (1957). It has been said that standards such as "the most
comfortable environment possible" are "so general as to be useless in testing a proposal....
Lynch, Site Planning 10 (1962).
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each new residential lot created. ° In the event that such dedication of
land was "not feasible or compatible with the comprehensive plan," the
subdivider was required to make an equivalent cash contribution (called
an equalization fee), of which $120 per lot was allocated for the local
school district and $80 per lot for the village's park and recreation area
fund. These funds were expendable only for site acquisition or capital
improvements.
The plaintiffs owned a 7.85 acre tract which they proposed to sub-
divide into twenty-five lots, without dedication of land for school or park
sites. They paid a $5,000 equalization fee under protest, completed the
marketing of the subdivision lots, and brought action to recover the fee.
They were successful in the trial court, but the decision was reversed on
appeal.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin first determined that compulsory dedi-
cation or payment of fees for school and recreational purposes was per-
mitted by the enabling act. Although the statute contained no specific
reference to these exactions, the court, by analogy to streetn and utilities,
held that compulsory dedication of land for school and park purposes
was authorizedV05 The court then focused its attention upon the reason-
ableness of the method by which the village had derived standards sped-
fying the amount of land to be dedicated. The defendants' "planning ex-
pert" had testified at the trial that:
... the experience of municipal planners throughout the country has shown
that for a good environment for human habitation, for each family in the
area, there must be a minimum of 3,000 square feet of land devoted to park
and school purposes. After some study of average land values in the village,
the village planning commission and the village board determined that land
valued at $200 would by and large provide the added park and school lands
required for each family brought into the village by creation of the sub-
division. 06
The plaintiffs contended that these exaction constituted a taking of prop-
204 Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 611, 137 N.W.2d 442, 444
(1965).
205 The common practice of providing for transportation in a subdivision is for munici-
pal platting ordinances to require dedication of land for streets by the subdivider.
Likewise the accepted way to provide water and sewerage facilities for a proposed sub-
division is to require the subdivider to provide the same as a condition to the municipal-
ity approving the proposed plat....
Similarly it would seem to follow that the way to facilitate provision for schools,
parks and playgrounds to serve the subdivision would be to require the subdivider to
dedicate a portion of the subdivision for such purposes.
Id. at 615-16, 137 N.W.2d at 446.
206 Id. at 615, 137 N.W.2d at 446. At a meeting of the village council before the ordinance
was adopted, this planning consultant had stated that the $200 fee was merely a "token"
payment, which would not "make even a dent in the burden of additional demands brought
on by new subdivisions." Brief for the Plaintiffs-Respondents, pp. 29, 31.
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"erty for public use without compensation, relying upon Pioneer Trust to
support their position. As in Billings, the court purported to accept the
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test; but it adopted a more lenient
approach than did Billings.
The record showed that the village's population had more than quad-
rupled between 1950 and 1964, while school enrollments had doubled be-
tween 1958 and 1963. Forty-one subdivisions had been approved subse-
quent to the adoption of the contested ordinance, from which a total of
five dedications had been required. The village had also been obliged to
purchase additional land for parks. The court concluded that this evidence
satisfied the village's burden of proof that the need for additional facilities
was occasioned by the development of the subdivision.
The opinion asserted that the justification for compulsory dedication
of land for park and school purposes was equally applicable to cash pay-
ments in lieu of dedication. The court held that the fees are simply a sub-
stitute for actual dedication, to be employed in cases where the size or
location of the subdivision render dedication impractical 081 The plaintiffs
did not cite Gulest in their brief, but they did argue that:
There are numerous cases prohibiting a control of subdivision of land which
was intended to benefit the public generally rather than special benefits the
land developed. There is no case where a tax was held to have been validly
collected to defray in part or in whole the costs of acquisition of public
sites for park or school purposes or the costs of construction of public im-
provements thereon as a condition for plat approval.2 9
The court correctly reasoned that the underlying premise of this conten-
tion was that cash in lieu of dedication can only be sustained as a special
assessment, i.e., where the special-benefits test is satisfied. That premise
was rejected, the court concluding that the general financial benefit ac-
207 In most instances, it would be impossible for the municipality to prove that the
land required to be dedicated for a park or a school site was to meet a need solely attrib-
utable to the anticipated influx of beople into the community to occupy this particular
subdivision. On the other hand, the municipality might be able to establish that a group
of subdivisions approved over a period of several years had been responsible for bring-
ing into the community a considerable number of people making it necessary that the
land dedications required of the subdividers be utilized for school, park, and recreational
purposes for the benefit of such influx. In the absence of contravening evidence this
would establish a reasonable basis for finding that the need for the acquisition was
occasioned by the activity of the subdivider.
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, supra note 204, at 617-18, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
208 The enabling act contained no provision expressly authorizing cash payments in lieu
of dedication. The court recognized that, in cases where dedication is impracticable because
of the subdivision's size or location, the only alternatives are to require a cash payment or
relieve the subdivider of any obligation to contribute toward filling the school and park
needs created by his activity. The power to exact cash in lieu of dedication was then implied
from "the stated purpose of the statute." Id. at 622, 137 N.W.2d at 450.
209 Brief for the Plaintiffs-Respondents, p. 22, Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,
supra note 204.
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cruing to the subdivider was sufficient to sustain the statute.2 10 The record
showed that the subdividers had received $100,000 from the sale of their
lots, with total expenditures of just under $74,000, including the dis-
puted fee.
A dissenting judge thought that the fee could be sustained only as a
special assessment or property tax and that, under either analysis, it was
defective. As a special assessment, it was invalid because of the absence
of special benefits. As a property tax, it was in contravention of the Wis-
consin constitutional requirement of uniformity211 The majority refused
to characterize the fee as a special assessment and rejected the property
tax contention, stating: "if a tax, it partakes of the nature of an excise
tax .... 2,,12
By requiring the village to establish a "rational nexus" between its ex-
actions and the public needs created by the new subdivision as defined by
the objectives in the enabling act, Jordan steers a moderate course be-
tween the judicial obstructionism of Pioneer Trust and the excessive defer-
ence of Billings Properties. It reaffirms that judges must not veto legisla-
tive declarations of public necessity, nor deliberately frustrate bona fide
efforts of local officials to cope With mounting urban problems. At the
same time, it retains ample scope for discharging the judicial duty to
shield individual landowners against unauthorized or excessively burden-
some municipal requirements. Thus, if the municipality can demonstrate
that its assessment of financial burdens against subdividers is rational,
impartial, and conducive to fulfillment of authorized planning objectives,
its action need be invalidated only in those extreme and presumably rare
cases where the burden of compliance is sufficiently great to deter the
owner from proceeding with his planned development.
The trend toward validation of subdivision exactions for facilities other
210 The municipality by approval of a proposed subdivision plat enables the subdivider
to profit financially by selling the subdivision lots as homebuilding sites and thus'realizing
a greater price than could have been obtained if he had sold his property as unplatted
lands. In return for this benefit the municipality may require him to dedicate part of his
platted land to meet a demand to which the municipality would not have been put but
for the influx of people into the community to occupy the subdivision lots.
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 619-20, 137 N.W.2d 442, 448 (1965).
211 Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 1.
212 Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, supra note 210, at 622, 137 N.W.2d at 450. The
decision has been criticized on the ground that the court's "unique interpretation" of enabling
legislation has approved a power of subdivision regulation which may be "virtually unlim-
ited." Note, "Validity of Subdivision Fees for Schools and Parks," 66 Colum. L. Rev. 974
(1966). It is suggested that the court should have invoked the special-benefit test of Gulest,
then moved to a "sophisticated application of cost-accounting methods" in order to limit
the scope of the power to exact fees in lieu of dedication. Id. at 980. Heyman and Gilhool,
who suggested the cost-benefit analysis to meet the "specifically and uniquely attributable"
test formulated in Pioneer Trust, had no such reverence for the special-benefit theory under-
lying Gulest. See note 190 supra.
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than streets and utilities received additional impetus from the recent de-
cision in Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale x1 The enabling act author-
ized village planning boards to require proposed subdivision plats to "show
in proper cases and when required by the planning board, a park or parks
suitably located for playground or other recreational purposes."A proviso
empowered the planning board to waive, "subject to appropriate condi-
tions and guarantees, for such period as it may determine, the provision
of any or all such improvements as in its judgment of the special circum-
stances of a particular plat or plats are not requisite in the interests of the
public health, safety and general welfare."2 4 The planning commission
of the Village of Scarsdale adopted an implementing resolution which
stated:
The Commission may require adequate, convenient and suitable areas
for parks or playgrounds, or other recreational purposes, to be set aside in
the subdivision and to be dedicated to the Village, as provided for by§ 179-1 of the Village Law. No arbitrary percentage of area shall be insisted
upon by the Commission, but, in general, subdividers will be required to set
aside up to 10 percent of the area for these purposes.
After considering the character and recreational needs of the neighbor-
hood in which the subdivision is located, the suitability of land in the sub-
division for park and playground purposes. . . the Commission may direct
and determine that cash is to be deposited in lieu of land dedications for
park, playground and recreational purposes. In such event, the Commission
shall require a cash deposit of $250 for each lot in the subdivision.
All such cash deposits shall be paid to the Village of Scarsdale and
credited to a separate fund to be used for park, playground and recreational
purposes in such manner as may be determined by the Village Board of
Trustees from time to time.215
The subdivider developed his tract in two sections, by separate plats.
The first was approved by the planning commission in 1956, subject to
an agreement that the developer would set aside land for park and play-
ground purposes for the entire tract at the time the second plat was sub-
mitted for approval. When the second plat was submitted in 1958, the
planning commission determined that there was no suitable park or play-
ground site within the subdivision. Since the two plats created twenty-four
213 '18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
214 N.Y. Village Law § 179-1 (McKinney 1951). This provision is substantially the same
as N.Y. Town Law § 277 (McKinney 1965), with a conspicuous exception: the Village Law
contains no express authorization for cash exactions in lieu of land dedication. See text at
note 179 supra. We have previously noted that the Village Law provision was declared
unconstitutional in Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209
N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1960), aff'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538
(2d Dep't 1962). See text accompanying notes 180-86 supra.
215 Regulations of the Planning Commission of the Village of Scarsdale, Art IV(P), § 2
(1957). See Brief for the Defendant-Appellants, pp. 4-5, Brief for the Plaintiff-Respondent,
p. 5, Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1966).
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new lots, the planning commission assessed the developer $6,000 in lieu
of land dedication. The developer paid this fee, then brought an action
for its recovery on the grounds that the village law did not authorize
its collection and, alternatively, that if the fee was authorized it was un-
constitutional.
The supreme court dismissed the complaint,216 ruling that the payment
was made voluntarily and not under duress. Consequently, even if the
regulation was invalid, the plaintiff had made a payment under mistake
of law which it could not recover.217 The appellate division reversed, grant-
ing the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment2 18 It held that Gulest
was controlling on the issue of the validity of Town Law § 179-13.19 Since
there was no requirement that funds paid in lieu of dedication be ear-
marked for the direct benefit of the new subdivision, the regulation was
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs. The court further held that
the payment was made under duress, and the plaintiff could maintain the
action despite its failure to file formal protest at the time the fee was paid.
A dissenter was of the opinion that the case was distinguishable from
Gdest in that (1) Scarsdale had safeguarded recreational funds against
withdrawal for other purposes, and (2) the village's area was so small as
to confer direct benefits on the plaintiff as well as other residents, wherever
the recreational facilities might eventually be located. 0
On appeal, the usual ultra vires and constitutional issues had become
somewhat obscured by the peripheral considerations which had been dis-
positive of the case in the two lower courts.221 Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeals decided both issues. It upheld the enabling act and the regulations
of the Scarsdale planning commission by a four-three decision.
216 Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 38 MAsc. 2d 658, 238 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1963).
217 This ground was apparently not even raised in the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. See Brief for the Plaintiff-Respondent, p. 3, Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale,
supra note 2.15.
218 Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 23 App. Div. 2d 784, 258 N.Y.S.2d 277 (2d Dep't
1965).
219 In our opinion, the decision in [Gulest] is dispositive of the constitutional issue here
raised and compels a determination that the subject provisions of the [Scarsdale] Village
Code are illegal and void .... We conclude that the law and regulations struck down
in the Gulest case are indistinguishable from the code provision here in issue.
Id. at 785, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
220 This contention contrasts with that of the developer in In re Lake Secor Dev. Co.,
141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1931), aff'd, 235 App. Div.
627, 255 N.Y. Supp. 853 (2d Dep't 1932), in which it was argued that the subdivision created
no need for recreational facilities because "all Putnam County is a park." Id. at 915, 252
N.Y. Supp. at 812.
221 I.e., issues of duress, waiver, and estoppel. As a result, only nine of the thirty-three
pages of the plaintiff-appellant's brief are devoted to the constitutional issue. Only Gulest is
cited and discussed. The constitutional issues consumed eight of the twenty-nine pages of the
defendants'-appellants' brief. These issues were considerably amplified in an amicus brief
filed on behalf of the New York State Home Builders Ass'n, Inc.
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Although the enabling act does not specifically authorize collection of
cash in lieu of land dedication, the power to waive dedication "subject
to appropriate conditions and guarantees" was held to permit this exac-
tion.222 Gulest appeared to offer strong support for the plaintiff's position,
even though it had no binding effect as precedent. The court in Jenad dis-
tinguished Gulest, employing the reasoning of the dissenter in the appel-
late division. But the majority did not simply distinguish Gulest; it cate-
gorically rejected the conclusion that the authorization for expenditure
of funds for "any recreatipnal purpose" is unconstitutionally vague.2a
The direct-benefit requirement was also rejected.
Although the majority relied upon Jordan and Billings to sustain the
Scarsdale fee against the "unreasonableness" contention, both cases are
arguably disfinguishable from Jenad. In Jordan the burden was placed
upon the municipality to demonstrate the relationship between the need
created by the new subdivision and the amount exacted from the de-
veloper. The record on appeal in Jenad does not indicate the basis on
which the amount of $250 per lot was determined, 25 or what connection
the fee bore to the need for recreational facilities created by the plaintiff's
development.2 ' Nor is there any discussion of the actual pecuniary effect
222 In so holding, the court adopted the position previously taken by the state comptroller.
Opinions, State Comptroller, No. 6836 (1954). This opinion was apparently not published. It is
printed in Brief on Behalf of New York State Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. as Amicus Curiae,
pp. 34-36, Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1966).
The state's attorney general had given conflicting opinions. In an unofficial, unpublished
1956 opinion, he had stated that N.Y. Gen. City Law § 33 (McKinney 1951), similar to
Town Law § 179-1 (McKinney 1965), did not authorize exactions of cash in lieu of dedica-
tion of land for parks where the planning board deemed it impracticable to require land to
be set aside for this purpose. See Brief on Behalf of New York State Home Builders Ass'n,
Inc. as Amicus Curiae pp. 37-38, Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, supra. Four years later, in
an official opinion, the attorney general expressly adopted the comptroller's 1954 opinion with
respect to Town Law § 277 (McKinney 1965), and held its reasoning equally applicable to
Village Law § 179-1 (McKinney 1951). See Opinions, N.Y. Att'y Gen. 127 (1960).
223 Even if the Gulest decision were correct-and we hold it is not-it would not apply
here since by the Scarsdale rules and regulations the moneys collected as "in lieu" fees
are not only put into "a separate fund to be used for park, playground and recreational
purposes" (there was no such reserve set up in Gulest) but, as provided by the board
of trustees, expenditures from such fund are to made [sic] only for "acquisition and
improvement of recreation and park lands" in the village. There is nothing vague about
that language.
Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, supra note 222, at 84, 218 N.E.2d at 675, 271 N.Y.S.2d at
957-58.
224 Id. at 84-85, 218 NYE.2d at 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
225 A memorandum presented to the Scarsdale mayor and trustees by the village attorney
on August 20, 1957 listed twenty-one California and three New York municipalities which
had adopted "cash in lieu" ordinances. The amount varied from $10 to $50 per lot, and from
$50 to $250 per acre. This memorandum was referred to the village's planning commission,
which recommended a cash deposit of $250 per lot. The trustees approved this recommendation
on September 24, 1957. Papers on Appeal from the Order, pp. 25-33, Jenad, Inc. v. Village of
Scarsdale, supra note 222.
226 In apparent recognition of the deficiencies of the regulations contested in Jenad, the
Scarsdale planning commission subsequently adopted the following amendment:
The Commission may require adequate, convenient and suitable areas for parks or play-
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of this exaction on the profitability of the plaintiff's enterprise. If the
Court of Appeals had actually followed Jordan, presumably it would have
remanded the case to the supreme court for further proceedings to estab-
lish the basis for the exaction of $250 per lot, and to determine whether
or not the fee would constitute an unreasonable burden on the plaintiff's
activity. Jordan, therefore, offers little support for the result actually
reached in Jenad.
Nor is Billings really in point. That case dealt with land dedication, not
cash in lieu thereof. The Montana enabling act established specific stan-
dards for determining the amount to be dedicated, subject to modification
by local officials. By contrast, the New York statute lays down no guide-
lines at all. It leaves the establishment of standards entirely to local plan-
ning commissions. Billings does offer support on the question of deference
to the legislative determination that subdivisions create a need for recrea-
tional facilities, but its rationale offers no support for the exaction actually
imposed upon the subdivider in Jenad.
The dissenting opinion closely follows the dissent in Jordan. It asserts
that the exaction cannot be upheld as a tax or special assessment, that the
police power does not extend to this type of exaction, and that the exac-
tion is neither authorized nor constitutional. Unfortunately, the dissenting
opinion ignores Jordan and Billings, thereby forfeiting an opportunity to
point out that neither case fully supports the result reached by the
majority.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of individual precedents is absolutely essential to an under-
standing of the presently confused state of subdivision control doctrines.
grounds, or other recreational purposes, to be set aside in the subdivision and to be
dedicated to the Village. No arbitrary percentage of area is prescribed by the Commis-
sion, but, in general, subdividers will be required to set aside up to 10 percent of the
area for these purposes. Upon written request of the subdivider, the Commission, after
considering the character and recreational needs of the neighborhood in which the sub-
division is located, the suitability of land in the subdivision for park and playground
purposes by reason of location, access, grade or cost of development or maintenance and
the possibility that land in the vicinity of the subdivision will serve, in whole or in part,
the park and playground needs of such subdivision, may direct and determine that cash
be deposited in lieu of land dedication for park, playground and recreational purposes.
In such event, the Commission may accept either (a) a payment to the Village of an
amount substantially equivalent to the value before subdivision of the amount of land
that could be required to be dedicated for park, playground and recreation purposes,
or (b) any equivalent combination of land and money. Such land value shall be deter-
mined by applying the latest equalization table of Westchester County to the average per
acre assessed value of the land included in the subdivision to derive a full value for said
land.
All money thus paid to the Village shall be kept in a capital reserve fund and shall be
paid out only for the acquisition and/or development of land (a) that is suitable for
park, playground or other recreational purposes and (b) that is so located that it will
serve the general neighborhood in which the land covered by the plat lies and (c) that
will be dedicated for use only for park, playground or other recreational purposes.
Regulations of the Planning Commission of the Village of Scarsdale, Art. V, § 4 (1961).
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A careful reading of early cases such as Ross and Ridgefield Land Co., for
instance, would have demonstrated the inapplicability of the "voluntari-
ness" and "privilege" rationales after platting ceased to be discretionary.
When these unsatisfactory doctrines finally gave way to the police-power
rationale, bench and bar were unprepared to apply the new analysis to
subdivision control problems. Meanwhile, the inexorable pressure of ur-
banization and suburbanization forced state and municipal legislatures to
take action to protect the public interest "while there was yet time.""
Their response to emerging public needs inevitably contravened certain
traditional attitudes about land ownership. As we have seen, the conflict
has been resolved generally in favor of such devices as compulsory dedica-
tion for streets and installation of subdivision utilities. On the issue of com-
pulsory dedication, or cash in lieu of dedication, for other public pur-
poses, however, the tide of judicial opinion has run in favor of subdividers
until very recent times.118 Billings, Jordan, and Jenad have probably re-
versed the trend, but their reasoning is so divergent that it will be some
time before consistent patterns of judicial review can be anticipated.
Meanwhile, courts in other jurisdictions will be forced to examine or re-
examine their own precedents in the light of these decisions.
Virtually every subdivision control dispute presents issues concerning
the constitutionality and interpretation of the enabling act, the validity
of the implementing ordinance, and the question whether a given regula-
tion constitutes so severe a burden as to be unreasonable as applied to
a particular subdivider. These issues are closely interrelated. Each in-
volves judgments about the proper scope of the police power and the ambit
of freedom from official regulation that is implicit in the concept of pri-
vate property.
The effect of the constitutional guarantee that private property not
be taken for public use except upon payment of just compensation adds
to the confusion. Clearly, the nonsubdivider is entitled to compensation
227 "Scarsdale and other communities, observing that their vacant lands were being cut up
into subdivision lots, and being alert to their responsibilities, saw to it, before it was too late,
that the subdivisions make allowance for open park spaces therein." Jenad, Inc. v. Village of
Scarsdale, supra note 222 at 84, 218 N.E.2d at 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
228 One of the most forceful statements contrary to this trend is the concluding paragraph
of Heyman & Gilhool, "The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on
New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions," 73 Yale L.J. 11,19, 1157 (1964):
We have chosen to challenge the emerging rule that would prohibit exactions for a full
range of municipal capital expenditures, particularly for schools and recreation. It seems
important to us to free so imprecise and troublesome an area as municipal finance,
haunted so often by necessity, from inflexible contitutional strictures. In an ideal world
the problems of municipal finance would be met more surely and just as fairly by some
system more thorough than subdivision exaction. In the meantime, municipalities must
meet the demands of the day as best they can, finding a few hundred thousand dollars
here and there, wherever they can. So long as our sense of fairness is not seriously af-
fronted-and exactions of the sort we have discussed here fall well within that limit-
municipalities must be left their salvation.
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for his land when it is converted to street, park, or other public use. Why
should the subdivider be excluded from this guarantee? 229 As implied by
the excise-tax rationale of Jordan, there is an elementary but vital distinc-
tion between developers and other landowners. The subdivider is a manu-
facturer, processer, and marketer of a product; land is but one of his raw
materials. In subdivision control disputes, the developer is not defending
hearth and home against the king's intrusion, but simply attempting to
maximize his profits from the sale of a finished product. As applied
to him, subdivision control exactions are actually business regulations.
In a very real sense, all subdivision control exactions are grounded upon
a judgment that subdivisions which do not provide adequate space for
streets, utilities, parks, and other public uses are defective. Although the
consumer may be able to discern the existence of such defects, his bar-
gaining power is probably too weak to force subdividers to provide neces-
sary improvements. From the municipality's point of view, the danger
from a defective subdivision is actually greater than the threat posed by
defectively manufactured automobiles, refrigerators, or other durable
goods. The subdivision remains, long after the automobiles have been
relegated to the junk heap, to spawn conditions of slum and blight. Fur-
ther, the removal or rehabilitation of a subdivision may necessitate large
expenditures of public funds. The ability of a defective environment to
cripple or maim its inhabitants may not be so dramatic and obvious as
that of automobiles and other inherently dangerous instrumentalities, but
it is no less real.
While assuring the provision of improvements deemed necessary for the
maintenance of acceptable living conditions, municipalities must recognize
that exactions which add such a financial burden as to discourage de-
velopers from undertaking residential subdivisions are self-defeating, espe-
cially in a society characterized by vigorous population growth. In purely
economic terms, the municipality must steer a course between permit-
ting the development of substandard subdivisions and imposing exactions
which are so severe as to stifle new development altogether.
From the subdivider's point of view, the crucial question is whether
his expected return from a subdivision sufficiently outweighs the costs
and risks involved. As long as he knows in advance the cost of public
improvements which he will be required to furnish, these costs can be
included in his projections. The ultimate purchaser, seeking the best
229 But while the [Ayres] development undoubtedly received some benefit from the
improvement [widening of Sepulveda Boulevard], it does not seem equitable that one
owner should be forced to donate land for the use of the general public merely because
he has decided to subdivide, while other owners, who will benefit to the same degree,
can force the city to exercise the power of eminent domain.
Note, "Land Subdivision Control," 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1226, 1233-34 (1952).
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value for the amount which he can afford, will consider many factors be-
sides the initial cost of house and lot. An unforeseen paving or sewer as-
sessment, for instance, can transform his dreamhouse into a financial
nightmare. Determination of those costs which the developer may con-
stitutionally be required to bear therefore requires accommodation of the
interests of all three parties: the municipality, the developer, and the
purchaser.2
30
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls231 offers the most consistent,
workable rationale for the accommodation of these interests within the
traditional police-power analysis. But Jordan, unlike Billings and Jenad,
charts a difficult course for municipal officials. The burden of establish-
ing a rational nexus between their exactions and the public needs at-
tributable to subdivision development is a substantial one. Standards can
be developed and supported only after considerable data have been gath-
ered and carefully analyzed.232 It may be impossible to determine to every-
one's satisfaction the precise point at which sufficient subdivision improve-
ments are furnished to prevent the development from being "substandard."
But if we accept similar uncertainties in zoning and building-code enforce-
ment, we should be equally willing to do so in subdivision control mat-
ters-provided, of course, that state and local officials allocate suffi-
cient resources to accomplish the formulation of defensible subdivision
standards.
230 See Note, "Prevention of Subdivision Control Evasion in Indiana," 40 Ind. L.J. 445,
447-50 (1965).
231 See text at notes 202-212 supra.
232 In theory, the most scientific way to relate the quantity of land to be dedicated to
the need for the use of such land would be to require a land use analysis of the parti-
cular needs of each subdivision relating to parks, school facilities, storm water drainage,
etc. Such a flexible provision is expensive, time consuming, and subject to abuse by
overzealous or uniformed officials. Much more common is the arbitrary requirement that
some definite percentage, such as 5 or 10 perecnt, of the land area be dedicated for such
purposes ....
It is most unscientific to take a fiat percentage of each subdivision for public land.
It would be far more logical to require, as is being done more and more, a cash con-
tribution which would be designed to defray that part of the cost of the public sites
required to serve the particular subdivision.
Cutler, "Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on the Urban
Fringe," 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 370, 389-90. For an example of detailed standards, see American
Public Health Association Committee on the Hygiene of Housing, Planning the Neighbor-
hood 48-49 (1960).
